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 The New Enemy hides in the shadows of anonymity.  As of September 11, 2001, 
combat in today’s world is much more challenging and requires a better understanding of 
the enemy and his support infrastructure.  There is a renewed interest in human 
intelligence (HUMINT) as expressed by the US Department of Defense and Intelligence 
Agencies.  But HUMINT is only data collected by human sources about an individual or 
group of individuals and their activities.  Cultural Immersion is a step above mere data 
collection…it allows its practitioners to understand the thought processes and/or the 
routines of questionable individuals or groups. 
Cultural immersion is a skill set that allows missions to develop and execute with 
smooth transitions.  It does not guarantee mission success but certainly assures greater 
mission success than can be achieved operating without it.  Cultural immersion 
“equalizes the playing field” when US/Coalition forces are operating in foreign lands 
against otherwise invisible or immersed enemies. 
This thesis examines various aspects of cultural immersion, how they relate to 
warfare, and proposes recommendations for cultural immersion supporting present day 
Naval Special Warfare (NSW) missions.  The intent is to provide decision makers a 
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What is called ‘foreknowledge’ cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from 
gods, nor from analogy with past events, nor from calculations.  It must be 
obtained from men who know the enemy situation. 
(Sun Tzu, 1971, p. 145, emphasis added) 
 
A. A HYPOTHETICAL TERRORIST SCENARIO 
Located in a small isolated harbor, along the western coastline of a country is 
what appears to be a commercial fishing trawler. Onboard this trawler, a very determined 
nine-man terrorist-planning cell is conducting a meeting to select high priority targets 
over the coming months.  Targets include key international landmarks, population 
centers, communications, transportation, and economic centers.  Through experience, this 
particular terrorist organization considers direct action against military targets too high 
risk. 
The members of this particular cell have links to other well known terrorist 
organizations currently engaged in what they refer to as the “Struggle against the ‘Great 
Demon’ or ‘Great Satan’”—which in turn refers to the western forces and their coalitions.  
The cell members continue their discussion by talking about manning issues and 
shipments of necessary weapons, explosive materials, falsified country documents, 
communications, medical supplies, and other logistics-type materials to carry out their 
operations.  The discussion continues well into the night and concludes with how the 
equipment and supplies are to be shipped via some outside source of transportation with 
the location of the drop-off at a pre-determined warehouse location. This terror cell relies 
on financial support from outside sources or developed points of contact in local regions 
to continue “their struggle.”  The cell also requires logistics support (including arms and 
explosives) from sympathetic countries. 
Ashore, some of the local populations in the nearby coastal fishing village know 
that these “new fishermen” who have been trawling and bottom fishing for the last couple 
of months seem to have some of the requisite gear and nets to catch the various native 
species of fish, and yet they are never rigged to do so—even during the height of the 
2fishing season.  The locals have noticed other peculiarities, such as when the “new 
people” do come into town they speak the local tongue but with poor accents; for 
fishermen the “new guys” are extremely clean and their hands are never scarred from 
pulling in lines and/or nets; and they are inappropriately dressed for the weather this time 
of year.  They rarely eat in the local restaurants and what provisions they obtain from the 
local market seem like unusual combinations for this region.  They also seem to be 
preoccupied all the time and rarely interact with the villagers.  They are private, almost 
guarded when approached. 
After only two more months they depart to parts unknown… 
Several months later a series of at sea transportation disasters occur, leaving large 
numbers of passengers dead or severely injured.  A year after the disasters it is 
determined—through exhaustive investigation—that these were not the consequence of 
coincidence or malfunctioning systems errors.  Instead, they were deliberate acts of 
sabotage, the intent or objective of which has yet to be determined.  There was no 
forewarning or intelligence ever to indicate that these attacks were even being planned.  
The only real oddity found was that the improvised explosive devices (IED) used in the 
attacks were secured to structures by commercial grade high-tensile fishing line and 
several fishing lures were soldered within the housing as part of each device’s detonator 
mechanism… 
B. WHAT IF THE SCENARIO COULD BE CHANGED? 
What if the same scenario is played out, but prior to any disasters and great loss of 
life the terror cell had been interdicted? What if some of the villagers happened to be 
friends with a known military man who travels to their seaport village and on occasion 
even goes fishing with them?  He speaks the local language fluently.  He is a talented 
fisherman, for being a non-local, and quite genuinely fond of his local fishing comrades.  
He often has dinner with several of his closest friends in the village to include the mayor.  
He has even helped out in the rescue of some local children when their boat was capsized 
in the bay. 
In the eyes of the locals he is a good man and they trust him. 
3Upon the arrival of the “new fishermen,” given their strange behavior, the locals 
tell their military friend, over dinner one night, about all the strange goings on.  The 
military man indicates “that is an interesting set of facts” and goes out fishing the next 
day with his friends and observes the suspicious trawler.  He leaves the next day and 
returns a day later with several of his military co-workers.  He asks the locals about the 
new fishermen’s routines and behaviors.  He sends two of his people to the best 
viewpoint of the harbor.  He asks if he can rent a local fishing vessel and is 
accommodated.  The man and his co-workers have communications equipment and lots 
of cameras. The man, his partner on the boat, and his companions on the point watch the 
new fishermen for over a week. 
The military man then goes to his closest local confidante and asks for a larger 
vessel, and again he is accommodated.  A day later another group of military men show 
up in several vehicles and motor out to the larger vessel now being used by the military 
man.  About four days pass, and the fourth night an explosion is heard followed by 
several gunshots from the suspect trawler.  After an hour or so the military man and his 
people motor their vessel and the terrorists’ vessel into port.  Several vehicles with local 
government military inside appear, and the nine terrorists are placed into them and driven 
away.   
What if the terrorist cell was a senior cell running operations for nine other cells? 
And as a result of the intelligence gathered the other nine cells were captured and a 
domino effect is initiated? 
For instance, a day later naval vessels intercept a large container ship.  A team of 
commandos takes command of the ship and stops it.  Once they secure the ship an 
inspection team is brought on board and the ship’s manifest is evaluated.  There are 
inconsistencies in the documents and the ship is subsequently searched from bow to stern.  
The search yields 1000 small arms (including shoulder fired missiles and rocket propelled 
grenades), thousands of rounds of ammunition, several hundred kilograms of explosives, 
communication equipment, several computers with numerous terrorist data bases loaded, 
and medical supplies.  A week later, over $100 million in assets are frozen as a result of 
4the database information captured in the ship’s computers.  Other effective operations are 
carried out.  More personnel, intelligence, and weapons and supplies are captured. 
The effects of the initial fishing vessel takedown can’t even be measured since 
one breakthrough leads to another, and the intelligence that is accumulated continues to 
have pay-offs months and even years later. 
C. REAL CAPABILITIES AND SKILLS TO CONDUCT THIS OPERATION 
There are several key lessons to take away from this set of scenarios:  The first is 
that the military man was observant and plugged into through a social network in the 
fishing village and knew enough about the locals’ habits to make sense of what they told 
him.  The second is that he spoke the local language, which allowed him to move about 
freely in the village.  The third is he had already established a relationship of trust by 
previously getting to know the locals and helping out with the rescue of their children.  
He was assigned to a military unit that he could call upon in short notice that could also 
bring to bear the needed equipment to conduct his reconnaissance of the “suspect 
personalities.” Once satisfied with the veracity of the locals’ intelligence, his teams’ own 
observations, and perhaps some form of reach-back capability to other intelligence 
resources, he was able to bring additional forces in to conduct the direct action on the 
suspect vessel.  The result of the raid on the fishing vessel not only stopped the 
transportation attacks from occurring, but yielded collateral outcomes such as actionable-
intelligence so that other cells could be interdicted, military supplies intercepted, 
financial assets frozen, and the terrorists disrupted. 
There are those in power in the US who, in theory, would like to see something 
like this happen…But, in practice we are hardly there yet. 
 
D. THE 9/11 REPORT:  UNITY OF EFFORT 
The Cold War is over.  The US is now focused on asymmetric threats posed by 
terrorists, insurgents, and possibly rogue states, not with tank division exercises, large 
troop movements, fleets setting out to sea.  Of these current threats the first two are of 
greatest concern, since rogue states tend to increasingly stand out alone with their 
activities much more readily identifiable.  Terrorists and insurgents, in contrast, can work 
5in anonymity and in the darkened corners of large cities.  They can also take advantage of 
shelters afforded by poor or weakened states.  With the right type of leadership they can 
exist in open societies for years unnoticed. 
Following the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York, 
Washington D.C., and Pennsylvania in November 2002, the US Congress and President 
George W. Bush established by law the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission.  This bipartisan panel was 
charged with the responsibility of examining facts and circumstances surrounding the 
single largest loss of life from an enemy attack on US soil.  Additionally, the 
Commission was directed to identify lessons learned, and provide recommendations to 
prevent such attacks from occurring in the future. 
For instance, one key objective of the strategy for the Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT) is to develop the “Ability to Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations.”  But to 
accomplish this daunting task requires a unity of effort on a global scale.  For the US 
portion of the GWOT, the 9/11 Commission made a number of observations and 
recommendations: 
Observation:  The September 11 attacks were a complex international 
operation, the product of years of planning.  Bombings like those in Bali 
in 2003 or Madrid in 2004, while able to take hundreds of lives, can be 
mounted locally.  Their requirements are far more modest in size and 
complexity.  They are more difficult to thwart…Complex international 
terrorist operations aimed at launching a catastrophic attack cannot be 
mounted by just anyone in any place.  Such operations appear to require 
¾ time, space, and ability to perform competent planning and staff 
work; 
¾ a command structure able to make decisions and possessing the 
authority and contacts to assemble needed people, money, and 
materials; 
¾ opportunity and space to recruit, train, and select operatives with 
the needed skills and dedication, providing the time and structure 
required to socialize them into the terrorist cause, judge their 
trustworthiness, and hone their skills; 
6¾ a logistics network able to securely manage the travel of 
operatives, move money, and transport resources (like explosives) 
where they need to go; 
¾ access, in the case of certain weapons, to the special materials 
needed for nuclear, chemical, radiological, or biological attack; 
¾ reliable communications between coordinators and operatives; and 
¾ opportunity to test the workability of the plan. 
(United States Congress & White House, 2004, pp. 366-367) 
Related to this subject, the 9/11 Commission made a number of 
recommendations, to include the following: 
Recommendation:  The US government must identify and prioritize 
actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries.  For each, it should have a realistic 
strategy to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run, using all 
elements of national power.  We should reach out, listen to, and work with 
other countries that can help. 
(United States Congress & White House, 2004, p. 367) 
On the subject of “Unity of Effort in the Intelligence Community,” the 9/11 
Commission pointed out the need to restructure the intelligence community given several 
problems that had become apparent before and after September 11th, 2001.  Perhaps the 
one that stands out—most, in terms of its relevance to the National Intelligence-Defense 
relationship, is, to quote from the report: 
Observation:   Structural barriers to performing joint intelligence work.  
National intelligence is still organized around the collection disciplines of 
the home agencies, not the joint mission.  The importance of integrated, all 
source analysis cannot be overstated.  Without it, it is not possible to 
‘connect the dots.’ No one component holds all the relevant information. 
By contrast, in organizing national defense, the Goldwater-Nichols 
legislation of 1986 created joint commands for operations in the field, the 
Unified Command Plan.  The services—the Army, Navy, Air Force, and 
Marine Corps—organize, train, and equip their people and units to 
perform their missions.  Then they assign personnel and units to the joint 
combatant commander, like the commanding general of the Central 
Command (CENTCOM).  The Goldwater-Nichols Act required officers to 
serve tours outside their service in order to win promotion.  The culture of  
7the Defense Department was transformed, its collective mind-set moved 
from service-specific to ‘joint,’ and its operations became more integrated. 
(United States Congress & White House, 2004, pp. 408-409) 
The 9/11 Commission goes on to discuss the current and future relationship 
between the Defense Department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).  The 
Commission points out that rebuilding the analytic and human intelligence (HUMINT) 
collection capabilities of the CIA should be a full-time effort. 
Recommendation:  The CIA Director should emphasize (a) rebuilding the 
CIA analytic capabilities; (b) transforming the clandestine service by 
building its human intelligence capabilities; (c) developing a stronger 
language program, with high standards and sufficient financial incentives; 
(d) renewing emphasis on recruiting diversity among operations officers 
so they can blend more easily in foreign cities; (e) ensuring a seamless 
relationship between human source collection and signals collection at the 
operational level; and (f) stressing a better balance between unilateral and 
liaison operations. 
(United States Congress & White House, 2004, p. 415) 
Recommendation:  Lead responsibility for directing and executing 
paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the 
Defense Department.  There it should be consolidated with the capabilities 
for training, direction, and execution of such operations already being 
developed in the Special Operations Command. 
(United States Congress & White House, 2004, p. 415) 
The 9/11 Commission cites the post-9/11 Afghanistan precedent of using joint 
CIA-military teams for covert and clandestine operations as a good start.  The 
Commission believes its proposals would deepen, broader, and strengthen the CIA-
military relationship along these lines; that each agency would concentrate on its 
comparative advantages in building capabilities for joint missions; and operations would 
be planned in common (United States Congress & White House, 2004, p. 416). 
E. NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE CULTURAL IMMERSION:  THE THESIS 
CHARTED OUT 
The US National Security Strategy, US National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism, and National Military Strategy documents make clear the need for increased 
military  operations  and  intelligence efforts to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations  
8as part of the GWOT.  But, how do you collect time critical and actionable intelligence 
on small well-organized groups of terrorists?  One possible method is by deploying SOF 
skilled in cultural immersion.  
What is cultural immersion, a military-frame, and in wartime what are its tenets? 
How can these be applied in warfare?  Have they been previously applied in times of 
war? And how can they be applied in support of Naval Special Warfare (NSW) missions? 
This thesis will address these topics in detail.  First, I will review and summarize 
Joint Doctrine and Policy, establishing their relevance and context in relation to current 
events.  Through detailed case study analysis, in particular of Naval Special Warfare 
Operations in Vietnam, I will then enumerate the requirements for effective cultural 
immersion.  I will also define cultural immersion, distinguishing its various features.  I 
will sketch out an existing framework for best employing cultural immersion as a 
practical and viable asset in support of all forms of NSW missions.  Finally, I will offer 
recommendations about how cultural immersion training and execution might find 
application within the realm of NSW.  
9II. STRATEGY AND POLICY 
We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the 
worst threats before they emerge.  In the world we have entered, the only 
path to safety is the path of action.  And this nation will act. 
     President George W. Bush 
     June 1, 2002 
     (White House, 2003, p. 13, emphasis added) 
A. US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY:  SETTING THE STAGE FOR 
CULTURAL IMMERSION 
On September 17, 2002, President Bush addressed the threat of terrorism: 
Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to 
endanger America.  Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring 
great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a 
single tank.  Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to 
turn the power of modern technologies against us.  To defeat this threat we 
must make use of every tool in our arsenal-military power, better 
homeland defense, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to 
cut off terrorist financing.  The war against terrorists of global reach is a 
global enterprise of uncertain duration…The United States and countries 
cooperating with us must not allow the terrorists to develop new home 
bases.  Together, we will seek to deny them sanctuary at every turn…So 
we must be prepared to defeat our enemies’ plans, using the best 
intelligence and proceeding with deliberation.  History will judge harshly 
those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. 
(The White House, 2004, pp. iv-v) 
Section III.  In the third section of the National Security Strategy (NSS) the 
President defines the enemy and discusses the importance of strengthening alliances to 
defeat global terrorism and to prevent attacks against the US and our friends.  The enemy 
is defined, not as a single political regime or person or religion or ideology, but instead, 
as those who would use acts of terrorism carried out in a “premeditated, politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against innocents” (White House, 2004, p. 5).  A point is 
made that the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) will be fought on many fronts by an 
elusive enemy and progress in the GWOT will come through ”persistent accumulation of 
successes-some seen, some unseen” (White House, 2004, p. 5).  The President states the 
priority for the GWOT is “first to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global 
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reach and attack their leadership; command, control, and communications; materials 
support; and finances” (White House, 2004, p. 5).  The directed means by which to 
achieve these ends is through direct and continuous action, by “identifying and 
destroying the threat before it reaches our borders…” (White House, 2004, p. 6) and by 
collaborative measures with US allies and friends. 
Section V.  The fifth section of the NSS deals with preventing enemies from 
threatening the US, its allies, and its friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  
The President states the US “must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist 
clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction” (White 
House, 2004, p. 14).  The US response to this threat must be through “innovation in the 
use of military forces, modern technologies…and increased emphasis on intelligence 
collection and analysis…and, when necessary, interdict enabling technologies and 
materials” (White House, 2004, p. 14).  The directed means by which to achieve these 
ends is “build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide timely, accurate 
information on threats, wherever they may emerge…” (White House, 2004, p. 16). 
Section VIII.  The eighth section of the NSS covers the developing agendas for 
cooperative action with the other main centers of global power.  The President talks of 
effective coalition leadership requiring clear priorities and an appreciation of others’ 
interests.  In his discussion of others the President refers to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the “need to streamline and increase the flexibility of 
command structures to meet new operational demands and the associated requirements of 
training, integrating, and experimenting with new force configurations” (White House, 
2004, p. 26).  The President also talks of Asian alliances and states the importance of 
“maintaining forces in the region that reflect our commitments to our allies, our 
requirements, our technological advances, and the strategic environment…” (White 
House, 2004, p. 26). 
Section IX.  The ninth section of the NSS is perhaps the key component in 
establishing the relationship between the NSS and the need reflects how essential it is to 
focus on cultural immersion and social networking.  The President speaks of value added 
by the forward presence of the US military and the new military focus on “how an 
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adversary might fight rather than where and when a war might occur” (White House, 
2004, p. 29).  He also talks about how innovation within the military will rest on 
“experimentation with new approaches to warfare…exploiting US intelligence 
advantages…the goal being provide the President with a wider range of military options” 
(White House, 2004, p. 30). 
The President places emphasis on the importance of intelligence and the necessity 
to enhance current US capabilities: 
Intelligence-and how we use it-is our first line of defense against terrorists 
and the threat posed by hostile states.  The intelligence community is 
coping with the challenge of following a far more complex and elusive set 
of targets (than it did during the Cold War).  We must transform our 
intelligence capabilities and build new ones to keep pace with the nature 
of these threats. 
(White House, 2004, p. 30, emphasis added) 
The President goes on to discuss the need to strengthen intelligence warning and 
analysis for national and homeland security citing the following initiatives in this area: 
¾ Strengthening the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to 
lead the development and actions of the Nation’s foreign intelligence 
capabilities; 
¾ Establishing a new framework for intelligence warning that provides 
seamless and integrated warning across the spectrum of threats facing 
the nation and our allies; 
¾ Continuing to develop new methods of collecting information to 
sustain our intelligence advantage; 
¾ Investing in future capabilities while working to protect them through 
a more vigorous effort to prevent the compromise of intelligence 
capabilities; and 
¾ Collecting intelligence against the terrorist danger across the 
government with all source analysis. 
(White House, 2004, p. 30) 
 Throughout the NSS, the President has declared the need for improved 
intelligence, military, and coalition support in the GWOT.  As the Commander-in-Chief, 
he has requested new capabilities for collecting intelligence—to include cultural 
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immersion and social networking—be brought to bear against hostile threats the US 
currently faces.  The next step is to evaluate the military’s perspective on these issues. 
B. US NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY: DEFINING REQUIREMENTS 
FOR GWOT AND CULTURAL IMMERSION IN THE MILITARY 
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Richard Myers, has stated the 
“’National Military Strategy’ (NMS) conveys my message to the Joint Force on the 
strategic direction the Armed Forces of the United States should follow to support the 
National Security and Defense Strategies in this time of war” (JCS, 2004a, p. iii).  He 
goes on to enumerate three priorities for success in the GWOT: 
¾ Win the War on Terrorism.  We must act now to stop terrorists 
before they attack the US again and root out transnational terrorist 
networks, sever their connections with state sponsors, eliminate their 
bases of operation…The mission requires the full integration of all 
instruments of national power, the cooperation and participation of 
friends and allies and the support of the American people. 
¾ Enhance our ability to fight as a joint force.  We must strengthen 
collaboration among our joint forces, agencies at all levels of 
government and multinational partners.  Key to such collaboration is 
an improved ability to collect, process, and share information. 
¾ Transform the Armed Forces.  Fielding new capabilities and 
adopting new operational concepts while actively taking the fight to 
terrorists.  Transformation requires a combination of technology, 
intellect and cultural adjustments-adjustments that reward innovation 
and creativity.   
(JCS, 2004a, p. iii, emphasis added) 
Section I.  The NMS introduces US military objectives for supporting the 
National Defense Strategy (NDS): protecting the US; preventing conflict and surprise 
attack; and prevailing against adversaries.  According to the NMS one of the key 
functional concepts for achieving these objectives is battlespace awareness.  The NMS 
reemphasizes the importance of a capabilities-based approach to force design and 
planning that focuses less on a specific adversary or where a conflict might occur and 
more on how an adversary might fight.  By following this joint operating concept (JOC) 
the US Joint Operating Force (JOF) can adapt and succeed across a wide variety of 
operations (JCS, 2004a, p. 3).  The key to this concept is the ability to “anticipate and 
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rapidly adjust to changes in the security environment to ensure the US improves its 
qualitative advantage over a more diverse set of adversaries-now and in the future” (JCS, 
2004a, p. 3). 
The focus of the military is on a wider range of enemies than in the past. Under 
the NMS adversaries include: non-state actors, terrorist networks, international criminal 
organizations, and illegal armed groups that threaten/undermine stability and security; 
and pose an irregular threat to the US and its Allies (JCS, 2004a, p. 4).  These adversaries 
use unconventional methods to conduct their missions and constantly seek to improve 
their asymmetric capabilities in order to target civilian populations, economic centers, 
and symbolic locations as a way to attack US and allies’ political will and resolve (JCS, 
2004a, p. 4). The NMS discusses the importance of intelligence systems for countering 
these current and future threats. 
Intelligence systems must allow commanders to understand enemy intent, 
predict threat actions, and detect adversary movements, providing them 
the time necessary to take preventative measures.  Long before conflict 
occurs, these intelligence systems must help provide a more thorough 
understanding of adversaries’ motivations, goals, and organizations to 
determine effective deterrent courses of action. 
(JCS, 2004a, p. 5, emphasis added) 
The NMS goes on to discuss the diverse operational regions for the military and 
the complexity of the battlespace.  This battlespace presents unique demands on military 
organizations: 
There exists an ‘arc of instability’ stretching from the Western 
Hemisphere, though Africa and Middle East and extends to Asia.  There 
are areas in this arc that serve as breeding grounds for threats to US 
interests.  Within these areas rogue states provide sanctuary to terrorists, 
protecting them from surveillance and attack.  Other adversaries take 
advantage of ungoverned space and under-governed territories from which 
they prepare plans, train forces, and launch attacks. 
(JCS, 2004a, p. 5, emphasis added) 
Section II.  Within this section the NMS details the three previously mentioned 
supporting military objectives of the NDS.  The “Protecting the US” objective portion 
discusses the fact that US commanders cannot rely only on reactive operations and a 
robust defensive posture, but must instead follow a strategy of anticipatory self-defense.  
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In short, when directed, US commanders will preempt, in self-defense, adversaries that 
pose a threat of grave harm.  The US will counter threats close to their source.  US forces, 
while operating in key regions such as those in the “arc of instability,” will, in essence, 
take the fight to the enemy.  It will be important for them to coordinate mission 
requirements from US theater security activities and multinational partners to access 
information and intelligence critical to anticipating and understanding new threats. 
Part of the information process is working with other nation’s militaries and other 
governmental agencies to establish favorable security conditions and increase the 
capabilities of partners.  “For example, intelligence partnerships with other nations can 
take advantage of foreign expertise and areas of focus and provide access to previously 
denied areas.” (JCS, 2004a, p. 10) 
The “Prevent Conflict and Surprise Attacks” piece of the NMS discusses the 
importance of vigilance in identifying conflict and anticipating adversary actions.  This 
readiness is accomplished through forward presence which is vital to time critical 
targeting missions.  Having solid intelligence capabilities that allow commanders to act 
rapidly is a key component of mission execution. 
Preventative missions require shared, ‘actionable intelligence’, and the 
rules of engagement that allow commanders to make timely decisions.  
This decision making process stresses collaboration, speed and 
responsiveness-key ingredients required when exploiting time-sensitive 
opportunities as they arise, especially against mobile, time critical targets.  
These missions require exacting analysis and synthesis of intelligence 
gathered by a combination of capabilities, including human and technical 
collectors.  These operations will generally involve coordinated efforts 
with other agencies and departments in the US government, placing a 
premium on information sharing, intelligence and collaborative planning. 
(JCS, 2004a, p. 12, emphasis added) 
Section III.  This section of the NMS focuses on the US force requirements and 
their applications in securing the battlespace.  US forces must be flexible, modular, and 
deployable with the ability to utilize each service’s strengths.  They must be able to 
anticipate and adapt to changing threat conditions.  The US forces must be networked in 
the regions in which they operate and have the ability to “collect, analyze and rapidly 
disseminate intelligence and other relevant information from the national and tactical 
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levels, then use that information to decide and act faster than opponents” (JCS, 2004a, p. 
14).  Another key aspect of the force of choice for the US is one that has “informed and 
empowered joint leaders who combine superior technical skills, operational experience, 
intellectual understanding and cultural expertise” (JCS, 2004a, p. 14) to employ military 
capabilities and perform critical joint roles. 
Section III of the NMS also lays out the applications of the various types of US 
forces, to include the use of conventional and special operations forces (SOF), and their 
importance to developing regional alliances and coalitions. 
Strong regional alliances and coalitions enhance expeditionary capabilities 
by providing physical access to host nation infrastructure and other 
support.  They also provide access to regional intelligence that enables the 
precise application of military capabilities and allows the US to focus 
combat power more effectively at the critical time and place…Such 
information and intelligence sharing helps build trust and confidence 
essential to strong international partnerships…The application of force 
against widely dispersed adversaries, including transnational terrorist 
organizations, will require improved intelligence collection and analysis 
systems. 
(JCS, 2004a, p. 15) 
Section III provides general details on the relationship between information and 
intelligence for securing the battlespace.  In order to secure the battlespace US forces 
must have battlespace awareness.  To gain awareness US forces must be given the 
doctrine, tools, and training to more effectively synchronize military capabilities with 
non-DOD assets.  New ways of thinking about acquiring, integrating, using and sharing 
information must be pursued.  This is in addition to new architectures for intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets that provide knowledge of adversaries. 
Persistent surveillance, ISR management, collaborative analysis and on-
demand dissemination facilitate battlespace awareness.  Developing the 
intelligence products to support this level of awareness requires collection 
systems and assured access to air, land, sea…Human collectors are a 
critical element in the collection system; they provide the ability to 
discern the intention of adversaries and produce actionable intelligence for 
plans and orders.  Intelligence analysts operating well forward must  
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have the ability to reach back to comprehensive, integrated databases and 
to horizontally integrate information and intelligence… 
(JCS, 2004a, p. 17, emphasis added) 
Section V.  In this section of the NMS, one information initiative is discussed as 
part of the ongoing effort to ensure military superiority.  The initiative is designed to 
facilitate interagency integration through the implementation of Counter-Terrorism (CT) 
Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) at five regional and two global 
combatant commands (JCS, 2004a, p. 21).  The JIACGs’ purpose is to facilitate 
information sharing across the interagency community. 
The NMS lays out a number of priorities and objectives to include battlespace 
awareness, regional information and intelligence, cultural expertise, and flexible force 
options.  The US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) meanwhile has a critical 
role in providing the specialized forces necessary to meet these priorities objectives of the 
NSS, NDS, and NMS. 
C. USSOCOM POSTURE STATEMENT: REFINING THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR SOF WITH CULTURAL IMMERSION SKILLS FOR GWOT 
The USSOCOM Posture Statement lays out the mission, responsibilities, core 
tasks, priorities, characteristics of SOF, and future vision for SOF characteristics and 
employment.  USSOCOM and its four subordinate commands have been actively 
engaged in the vast majority of global conflicts since USSOCOM’s establishment under 
the “Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the DOD Authorization Act of 1987” (HQ USSOCOM, 
2003-2004, p. 9).  Additionally, USSOCOM has specific responsibilities it must adhere to 
under US Law Title 10 (Sec 167) to include the “formulation and submitting of 
requirements for intelligence support” (HQ USSOCOM, 2003-2004, p. 10).  USSOCOM 
is one of the nine US combatant commands directly responsible to the President and 
Secretary of Defense. 
As a functional combatant command, USSOCOM has been given lead 
responsibility for waging the war on terrorism.  Its duties in connection 
with this responsibility include planning, directing, and executing special 
operations in the conduct of the war on terrorism.  USSOCOM also  
provides special operations forces (SOF) to support the Geographic 
Combatant Commander’s theater security cooperation plans. 
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(HQ USSOCOM, 2003-2004, p. 11, emphasis added) 
Mission of USSOCOM:  to plan, direct, and execute special operations in 
the conduct of the GWOT in order to disrupt, defeat, and destroy terrorist 
networks that threaten the US, its citizens and interests worldwide.  
USSOCOM organizes, trains, and equips special operations forces 
provided geographic combatant commanders, American ambassadors and 
their country teams. 
(HQ USSOCOM, 2003-2004, p. 4, emphasis added) 
Special operations (SO) are operations conducted in hostile, denied, or 
politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, 
informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities 
for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These 
operations often require covert, clandestine, or discreet capabilities. 
Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. 
They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of 
conventional forces or other government agencies and may include 
operations by, with, or through indigenous or surrogate forces.  Special 
operations differ from conventional military actions in the following ways:  
greater degree of physical and political risk; unique operational 
techniques, mode of employment, and independence from friendly 
support; detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. 
(HQ USSOCOM, 2003-2004, p. 7, emphasis added) 
Special operations forces (SOF) are those forces assigned, by USSOCOM, to 
execute the afore-mentioned special operations.  They have specialized skills, equipment 
and tactics, are regionally focused, have language skills, are politically and culturally 
sensitive, operate with economy of force, and can operate jointly or autonomously.  Their 
ubiquitous presence as “Global Scouts” serves to: assure allies and friends of US 
government resolve; shape the pre-conflict battlespace to set conditions favorable to the 
US; and provide a strategic economy of force in areas of the world left uncovered by the 
commitments of conventional forces to other priorities (HQ USSOCOM, 2003-2004, p. 
28). 
The SOF assigned to the four USSOCOM subordinate commands have nine core 
tasks which they are expected to accomplish.  These core tasks include:  
“Counterterrorism (CT), Counter Proliferation (CP), Special Reconnaissance (SR), Direct 
Action (DA), Unconventional Warfare (UW), Information Operations (IO), 
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Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and Civil Affairs 
Operations (CAO)” (HQ USSOCOM, 2003-2004, p. 36). 
Although counterterrorism has long been a core task of SOF, the events of 
September 11, 2001 focused national interest on several urgent national 
priorities:  Destroying al’Qaida and other parts of the international terrorist 
network; speeding transformation of the military; countering the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated delivery 
systems; and strengthening intelligence collection and dissemination. 
(HQ USSOCOM, 2003-2004, p. 36) 
One of the predictors for where USSOCOM is going in the future is the 
Commander’s “Vision Statement.”  Some of the key points within the USSOCOM vision 
include:  The command taking an active role in keeping special operations special and 
relevant with a special emphasis on the importance of regional expertise, presence, and 
influence. 
The Vision.  To develop ‘the most capable special operations force, 
relevant to the needs of our nation ...any time ...any place ...any 
adversary’…The Command must constantly strive to keep the ‘special’ in 
special operations…Any future special operations force will be:  Sized, 
trained, and equipped to engage in any threat environment against any 
adversary; Culturally, linguistically, politically, and regionally focused; 
Rapidly deployable; Capable of conducting exceptionally-precise 
discriminate strikes against specific targets; Able to achieve operational 
and tactical superiority through surprise, speed, violence of action, and 
through the ability to facilitate the precise application of massive 
conventional firepower; Flexible, tactically, operationally, and 
strategically agile joint forces that can develop and execute 
unconventional, audacious, and high pay-off courses of action. Given 
these basic parameters, it is clear that SOF of the future will be called 
upon to employ unorthodox approaches, at any time, in any place, against 
any adversary, toward the end of achieving lasting strategic effects that are 
beneficial to the United States. 
(HQ USSOCOM, 2003-2004, p. 65, emphasis added) 
Regional Expertise, Presence and Influence. SOF conduct and influence 
operations anywhere, with minimal restrictions, through an extensive 
personal understanding and a network of relationships throughout the 
region. SOF are regionally focused, possessing extensive linguistic skills 
and cultural understanding. The SOF Warrior is also a diplomat, and as 
such utilizes recurring deployments to increase language skills, cultural 
awareness, and to build the military and political contacts that contribute 
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to future operations and activities.  Healthy working relationships are 
maintained with potential joint, interagency, coalition and non-state 
partners. The effective presence and embedded interagency integration 
produced by these relationships provides SOF a footing from which to 
influence events. Through recurring interaction with current and potential 
coalition partners, SOF are able to favorably influence situations toward 
U.S. national interests. SOF presence and influence serve multiple roles in 
peacetime and before, during, and after conflict. SOF forward presence 
and regional expertise allow for ‘first response’ abilities when required 
and, permit a full range of unconventional military options against a 
targeted entity. SOF are immediately ready upon arrival to occupy and 
influence the area of operations as prescribed by the mission and possess 
the flexibility to be tailored to task. 
(HQ USSOCOM, 2003-2004, p. 67, emphasis added) 
Future missions might include operations for psychological effect, low visibility 
strike operations, advanced unconventional warfare, special forms of reconnaissance, 
human and technical information and intelligence collection operations and strategic 
influence operations (HQ USSOCOM, 2003-2004, p. 72).  Given such responsibilities, 
we might ask who will be the SOF assigned to conduct these “future missions,” as well as 
continue to support the nine core missions? 
D. NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE:  SOLUTION TO MARITIME AND 
LITTORAL BATTLESPACE AWARENESS IN GWOT 
The mission of the Naval Special Warfare Command (CNSWC) is to prepare 
NSW forces to carry out assigned missions and to develop maritime special operations 
strategy, doctrine, and tactics (Naval Special Warfare Command, 2004).  The 
Commander of NSWC exercises operational control over all United States-based NSW 
forces and as such is responsible for the training, equipping, and any additional support 
required by these forces.  CNSWC is also responsible for providing trained and ready 
NSW forces to theater Special Operations Commanders (SOCs) and other—maritime, 
ground, and air—component commanders (Naval Special Warfare Command, 2004). 
NSW core mission areas include SR, and DA. NSW also CT, UW,  FID, 
information warfare assistance (IW), security assistance, counter-drug operations (CD), 
personnel recovery (PR) and hydrographic reconnaissance (Commander United States 
Naval Special Warfare Command, no date). NSW forces can operate independently or 
integrate with other U.S. special operations forces or within U.S. Navy carrier battle 
20
groups [now Carrier Strike Groups] and amphibious ready groups [now Expeditionary 
Strike Groups] (Naval Special Warfare Command, 2004). 
The current CNSWC’s vision focuses on counter-terrorism and a return to the 
other core Sea-Air-Land Team (SEAL) competencies, and initiatives that will further 
increase Navy and joint interoperability (“SEALs Focus Is On Terrorism, Core Missions, 
Interoperability,” 2003).  The primary mission areas for NSW consist of SR, and DA 
(“SEALs Focus Is on Terrorism, Core Missions, Interoperability,” 2003). 
1) Counterterrorism (CT) – is USSOCOM’s number one mission. CT 
produces effective protective measures to reduce the probability of a 
successful terrorist attack against U.S. interests. This task involves 
offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to 
terrorism. SOF are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to 
conduct covert, clandestine, or discreet CT missions in hostile, denied, or 
politically sensitive environments. These missions include, but are not 
limited to intelligence operations, attacks against terrorist networks and 
infrastructures, hostage rescue, recovery of sensitive material from 
terrorist organizations, and non-kinetic activities aimed at the ideologies or 
motivations that spawn terrorism. 
(HQ USSOCOM, 2003-2004, p. 36, emphasis added) 
2) Special Reconnaissance (SR) – reconnaissance and surveillance 
actions conducted as special operations in hostile, denied or politically 
sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or 
operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally 
found in conventional forces. These actions provide an additive capability 
for commanders and may supplement other intelligence collection when 
conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions are limited by 
weather, terrain, or adversary countermeasures. 
(HQ USSOCOM, 2003-2004, p. 36) 
3) Direct Action (DA) – the conduct of short duration strikes and other 
small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, 
denied, or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, 
exploit, recover, or damage designated targets of strategic or operational 
significance, employing specialized military capabilities. Direct action 
differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and 
political risk, operational techniques, and the use of discriminating force to 
achieve specific objectives. 
(HQ USSOCOM, 2003-2004, p. 36) 
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When considering that two thirds of the Earth’s inhabitants are located on or near 
large bodies of water it would seem to make sense that NSW forces be considered for 
cultural immersion training and subsequent missions that would utilize cultural 
immersion skills.  NSW forces are still relatively small when compared to the other US 
SOF, and thus enables them to adapt easily to changing environments.  Also of note:  
NSW forces and their predecessors have been involved via some form of special 
operations in every major (and minor) conflict since WWII. 
During WWII, groups of US military volunteers trained for, and were placed into, 
some of the most hazardous environments the War had to offer, including covert 
operations behind enemy lines.  These volunteers made up the Scouts and Raiders, Naval 
Combat Demolition Units (NCDU), Office of Strategic Services Maritime Units (MU) 
and Operational Swimmers, Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT) or “frogmen,” and 
Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons (Commander United States Naval Special Warfare 
Command, no date). None of these units are in existence today but they all utilized 
various forms of unconventionality to achieve their mission success.  Moreover, these 
units contributed greatly to the development of the modern day SEAL teams, Special 
Boat teams (SBT), and SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) teams, all of which today belong 
to the Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC). 
During the Korean War the UDTs provided hydrographic and special 
reconnaissance (SR) in support of the landing at Inchon, as well as demolition raids on 
bridges and tunnels along the Korean coastline (Commander United States Naval Special 
Warfare Command, no date).  The UDTs were also called upon to work with the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) to train South Korean guerillas for raids, demolitions, and 
rescues of downed aircrew (Dockery, 1991, p. 84). 
In 1962, in response to President Kennedy’s directive that each of the U.S. armed 
forces develop an unconventional capability, the Navy drew from its pool of UDT 
personnel to form separate units called SEAL Teams.  In January of that year, SEAL 
Team ONE (Pacific Fleet) and SEAL Team TWO (Atlantic Fleet) were commissioned.  
Their mission areas focused on unconventional warfare (UW), counter-guerilla warfare, 
and clandestine operations in both blue and brown water environments (Commander 
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United States Naval Special Warfare Command, no date). In Vietnam, the SEALs, UDTs, 
and their riverine boat units worked very closely with Lien Doc Nquoi Nhia (LDNN, 
South Vietnamese frogmen), provincial reconnaissance units (PRU), Montagnards, and 
Chieu Hoi (ex-Viet Cong) to conduct numerous intelligence and offensive operations 
(Dockery, 1991, p. 209, emphasis added).  In 1967, the Naval Operations Support Groups 
were renamed Naval Special Warfare Groups (NSWG). 
Post-Vietnam War operations that NSW forces have participated in 
include:  URGENT FURY (Grenada 1983); EARNEST WILL (Persian 
Gulf 1987-1990); JUST CAUSE (Panama 1989-1990); and DESERT 
SHIELD/DESERT STORM (Middle East/Persian Gulf 1990-1991). 
Additionally, NSW has conducted missions in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and 
Liberia. 
(Commander United States Naval Special Warfare Command, no date) 
NSW forces continue to conduct their missions in support of the GWOT.  NSW 
forces have played vital roles in both ENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan, 2001); and 
IRAQI FREEDOM (Middle East/Persian Gulf 2003-Present).   
In response to the attacks on America Sept. 11, 2001, Naval Special 
Warfare forces put operators on the ground in Afghanistan in October. The 
first military flag officer to set foot in Afghanistan was a Navy SEAL in 
charge of all special operations for Central Command. Additionally, a 
Navy SEAL captain commanded Combined Joint Special Operations Task 
Force (CJSOTF) South. Commonly referred to as Task Force K-BAR, the 
task force included U.S. Navy, Army, Air Force and Coalition SOF forces. 
During Operation Enduring Freedom, NSW forces carried out more than 
75 special reconnaissance and direct action missions, destroying more than 
500,000 pounds of explosives and weapons; positively identifying enemy 
personnel and conducting Leadership Interdiction Operations (LIO) in the 
search for terrorists trying to escape by sea-going vessels. 
Naval Special Warfare has played a significant role in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, employing the largest number of SEALs and SWCC in its 
history. NSW forces were instrumental in numerous special 
reconnaissance and direct action missions including the securing of the 
southern oil infrastructures of the Al Faw peninsula and the off-shore gas 
and oil terminals; the clearing of the Khawr Abd Allah and Khawr Az 
Zubayr waterways that enabled humanitarian aid to be delivered to the 
vital port city of Umm Qasr; reconnaissance of the Shat Al Arab 
waterway; capture of high value targets, raids on suspected chemical, 
biological and radiological sites; and the first POW rescue since WWII. 
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Additionally, NSW is also fighting the war on terrorism in other global hot 
spots including the Philippines and the Horn of Africa. 
(Commander United States Naval Special Warfare Command, no date) 
To continue the successful accomplishment of their missions NSW forces will 
need the best possible actionable intelligence available.  Which raises another 


















III. CULTURAL IMMERSION IN EARLY TO MID-TWENTIETH 
CENTURY WARFARE 
A. T.E. LAWRENCE AND EARLY CULTURAL IMMERSION DURING 
THE FIRST WORLD WAR CAMPAIGN FOR ARABIA 
The quintessential and, perhaps, the best known practitioner of early twentieth 
century cultural immersion and networking is Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence.  As a 
British Intelligence and Liaison Officer, he set the precedent for the last hundred years of 
cultural immersion in warfare.  His exploits in Arabia make for great tales of adventure 
and yet are still offer relevance for cultural immersion in modern day warfare. 
Lawrence was sent into the Arab Revolt (1916-1918) with orders to establish 
relations with the local tribal leaders in order to organize them into fighting units and 
intelligence support against the Turks, one of Germany’s allies.  The British hope was the 
defeat of Turkey while Great Britain waged its primary campaign against Germany 
during the First World War (WWI).  For Lawrence the challenge at hand was how to 
establish solid working relationships with the most effective tribal leaders in the region to 
enable the British plan. 
The Grand Shereef Hussein, with some British support, on June 9, 1916 attempted 
to bring life to the Arab Revolt by attacking Turkish and German fortifications in the 
cities of Medina, Jeddah, and Mecca but was unsuccessful in progressing with the Revolt 
when his forces ran out of ammunition (Thomas, 1924, p. 76).  Lawrence believed the 
failures of the previous British-encouraged Arab revolution against the Turks were due to 
faulty leadership, or rather to the lack of leadership, Arab and English.  In an effort to 
find effective Arab leaders he went down to Arabia to meet and evaluate its great men.  
The first, the Sherif of Mecca, we knew to be aged.  I found Abdulla too 
clever, Ali too clean, and Zeid too cool.  Then I rode up-country to Feisal, 
and found him the leader with the necessary fire, and yet with reason to 
give effect to our science.  His tribesmen seemed a sufficient instrument, 
and his hills to provide natural advantage.  So I returned confidently to 
Egypt, and told my chiefs how Mecca was defended not by Rabegh, but 
by Feisal in Jebel Subh. 
(Lawrence, 1938, p. 8) 
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Once a reliable Arab leader and reliable tribes were identified, Lawrence drew 
upon his cultural immersion skills (regional expertise from past excursions to Arabia, his 
mapping skills developed while in the military, his language skills, his understanding of 
the people through his previous interactions with them, as well as his formal education) 
to accomplish the tasks laid out before him.  Lawrence traveled extensively up and down 
the Semitic East before WWI working as an archaeologist and Arab supervisor at the 
various dig sites, and through the course of his travels, he learned the manners of the 
villagers, tribesmen, and citizens of Syria and Mesopotamia.  He was not wealthy and 
therefore had to “mix with the humbler classes, those seldom met by European travelers” 
and went on to say “thus my experiences gave me an unusual angle of view, which 
enabled me to understand and think for the ignorant many as well as for the more 
enlightened whose rare opinions mattered” (Lawrence, 1938, p. 55).  Lawrence also 
admitted that even with his unique skills and diverse background, he could not pass as an 
Arab, but instead chose to work among them.  He specifically states: 
I was sent to these Arabs as a stranger, unable to think their thoughts or 
subscribe their beliefs, but charged by duty to lead them forward and to 
develop to the highest any movement of theirs profitable to England in her 
war.  If I could not assume their character, I could at least conceal my 
own, and pass among them without evident friction, neither a discord not a 
critic but an unnoticed influence. 
(Lawrence, 1938, p. 30) 
To further his efforts to blend in Lawrence dressed in Arab clothes at the behest 
of the senior tribal leader, Sherif Feisal.  The purpose was to allow Lawrence to immerse 
himself and thus move freely amongst the various tribal hosts and local peoples without 
raising the suspicions a more conventional western uniform would provoke. 
I should find it better for my own part, since it was a comfortable dress in 
which to live Arab-fashion as we must do.  Besides, the tribesmen would 
then understand how to take me.  The only wearers of khaki in their 
experience had been Turkish officers, before whom they took up an 
instinctive defense.  If I wore Meccan clothes, they would behave to me as 
though I were really one of the leaders; and I might slip in and out of 
Feisal’s tent without making a sensation which he had to explain away 
each time to strangers. 
(Lawrence, 1963, p. 95) 
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According to Lowell Thomas in his book With Lawrence in Arabia (1924), 
Lawrence’s success in moving into some of the most inner circles of Arabia can be 
attributed to several factors:  he demonstrated strong resolve to accomplish anything he 
set out to do; he would lead in battles; he possessed a detailed knowledge of their 
intricate customs; he demonstrated an “apparent complete mastery” of the Koran and 
complex Mohammedan law (p.365); he wore the native dress of the people, thus paying 
them a great compliment (p.366); he was observant; and he was ever mindful of the 
words he used and actions he engaged in so as not to offend his Arab hosts; he was 
superb in 10 languages in addition to being able to manipulate many of the Arabic 
dialects of the Near East (p. 372). 
Lawrence made several key observations about his own military intelligence 
community.  These observations hold some pertinence and, perhaps, a warning to 
present-day NSW efforts in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) regarding the 
importance of effective cultural immersion and networking.  For instance he commented 
on the fact that his superior in the military intelligence branch had never been to Turkey, 
or read about it, and knew no Arabic.  The staff did not supply the necessary knowledge, 
as none of them knew Turkish, and only one individual could speak Arabic.  This 
individual was an office man (a clerk, a non-field operative), who was located in Basra 
and ran the Secret Service Work.  He was not co-located with the ranking officer and, 
therefore, no information was passed between the two. 
It is rather difficult for us to realize that the Intelligence Staff at such 
places as Basra, Amara, Ali Gharbi, Sheikh Saad, Nasiriya, Ahwaz, and 
with the Corps in the fighting line, cannot speak any of the local 
languages.  They do all their examination of agents, prisoners and 
refugees, through interpreters.  They never learnt or read anything of the 
manners of Turk or Arab, or of their customs.  They know nothing of the 
country beyond them:  they cannot test an agent by cross-questioning:  the 
supply of good interpreters is very limited, so that many of the finer points 
that make the difference between obvious truth and falsehood are missed.  
Also you get gross errors of place or number, besides confusion of 
technical military terms. They get their knowledge of Turkish 
communications from various military reports…:  they learn the Turkish 
Army from the Turkish Army Handbook, and they follow events in 
Turkey from the Cairo Bulletin, which is a sort of bible to them. 
(Wilson, 1990, p. 949) 
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As he had intended, Lawrence was able to use his cultural immersion skills to 
cultivate a genuine air of trust among his Arab hosts.  With the establishment of rapport, 
Lawrence was able to personally organize and lead some of the most successful assaults, 
ambushes, and demolition raids against Turkish fortifications and railroads during the 
Arabian Campaign, which in turn allowed the British to continue their larger focus on 
fighting Germany in Europe. 
What, we might wonder, do Lawrence’s cultural immersion efforts mean 
to modern day Naval Special Warfare (NSW) operations? NSW, like other war 
fighting entities, relies on actionable intelligence reports to conduct its missions.  
But, without ground truth information of the intended battle space, mission 
success is potentially degraded.  We see this most vividly when we consider our 
position today with that of the US during the Second World War (WWII).  
B. FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN SOF DURING THE SECOND WORLD 
WAR AND EARLY BEGINNINGS OF CULTURAL IMMERSION IN 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
Before America’s involvement in the Second World War, the United States 
possessed a limited and poorly coordinated capacity for intelligence gathering.  The US 
seemed to have an aversion to immersing any personnel in other countries for fear of 
being accused of spying.  The responsibility for gathering foreign intelligence fell to the 
State Department, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), the War Department’s Military 
Intelligence Division (MID or G-2), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  
According to Warner (1991), the WWII intelligence process could be defined as follows:  
The process of information gathering falls in two distinct categories:  one 
is observation, such as that provided by aerial photography; the other is 
information provided by agents or spies…in the second category comes 
the whole army of spies, agents, paid ‘neutral’ informers and listeners (p. 
120).  
The State Department diplomats obtained intelligence through official business or 
secret meetings with carefully cultivated contacts. The State’s Division of Information 
was little more than a press office that provided new releases for general public 
consumption.  The ONI and G-2 were understaffed and under funded.  Most of the ONI 
work was conducted through attachés serving in overseas postings.  The attachés were 
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strictly curtailed in their level of intelligence gathering.  By 1939, ONI had 17 attaché 
posts, nine in Europe and eight in South America.  The G-2 in 1940 had a mere 80 total 
staffers.  The FBI had no mandate to gather foreign intelligence until 1940, and when it 
did establish it’s Special Intelligence Service, it focused on operations in Latin America 
only.  Information discrimination was a significant problem up all chains of command.  
There was no clearing house to ensure the departments shared their findings.  “ONI 
candidly summed up the situation:  ‘A real undercover foreign intelligence service, 
equipped and able to carry on espionage, counter-intelligence, etc. does not exist’” 
(O’Donnell, 2004, p. xiii). 
However, on July 11, 1941, President Roosevelt, under pressure from the British, 
took a decisive step toward improving intelligence matters.  He ordered the establishment 
of a new White House agency, the Coordinator of Information (COI).  The COI had a 
significant mandate: 
Authority to collect and analysis all information and data, which may bear 
upon the national security; to correlate such information and data; and to 
make such information and data available to the President and to such 
departments and officials of the Government as the President may 
determine…(O’Donnell, 2004, p.xiii). 
The President selected Major General William “Wild Bill” Donovan as the 
director of the COI.  Donovan was a Congressional Medal of Honor recipient from WWI, 
as well as previous assistant attorney general under Calvin Coolidge.  He was charged 
with traveling overseas to assess the British staying power in the war.  Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill, in a show of good faith, granted Donovan complete access to all of 
Britain’s greatest intelligence and defense secrets.  The President was impressed with 
Donovan’s reports and sent him to tour the Mediterranean and Balkans.  These trips 
would provide him with several ideas for COI’s intelligence and cultural immersion 
capabilities. 
Following one of the greatest intelligence failures of the war, namely the 
December 7, 1941 attacks on Pearl Harbor, intelligence quickly became a primary 
concern for the US, and specifically for the newly formed Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).  
Donovan was still struggling to integrate COI efforts with those of the military, but a 
major stumbling block was the fact that the service chiefs tended to rely on their own 
30
intelligence braches for information.  With his hand tied, Donovan, in a political effort to 
gain military support and resources, acted as a lead proponent, suggesting that COI be 
brought under the control of JCS.  On June 13, 1942, the president officially endorsed the 
idea and the COI was renamed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). 
A central element in the OSS was what today we call special operations forces 
(SOF).  SOF could be broken down into small teams of operatives that would create 
disruptions behind enemy lines and gather intelligence.  The OSS departments under 
Donovan included: 
¾ Research & Analysis (R&A) for intelligence analysis. 
¾ Research & Development (R&D) for weapons and equipment 
development. 
¾ Morale Operations (MO) for subversive, disguised, “black” 
propaganda. 
¾ Maritime Units (MU) for transporting agents and supplies to 
resistance groups.  MU frogmen (one of the precursors to modern 
NSW units) also conducted naval sabotage and reconnaissance. 
¾ X-2 for counterespionage. 
¾ Secret Intelligence (SI) covered agents in the field who covertly 
gathered intelligence. 
¾ Special Operations (SO) for sabotage, subversion, fifth-column 
movements, and guerilla warfare. 
¾ Operational Groups (OG) also for sabotage and guerilla warfare, 
made up of highly trained foreign-language-speaking commando 
teams. 
(O’Donnell, 2004, p. xvi) 
Donovan utilized his personal contacts to recruit the best and brightest.  The OSS 
often went to top universities, law firms, and major corporations for their operatives.  The 
new recruits tended to be young and innovative.  Unusual, unorthodox, creative thinking 
was fostered within the OSS.  A battery of tests was used to assess intelligence and 
aptitudes of prospective recruits.  Once past the examinations, the trainees were funneled 
into the OSS training pipeline.  Schooling for the OSS trainees included infiltration 
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techniques, weapons handling, demolitions, sabotage (including railroad infrastructure), 
hand-to-hand combat, intelligence gathering (to include field practical examinations on 
immersion and agent handling), and language skills. 
The OSS contributed to the over-all Allied war effort throughout WWII by 
providing useful tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence, and by promoting and 
supporting resistance movements in enemy-occupied territory.  The OSS set the standards 
for modern day special operations and intelligence gathering.  The OSS was active in 
every theater of the war. 
1. Europe and Africa 
In late 1942, the OSS dispatched instructors overseas to train foreign nationals for 
work in Europe.  Many of the OSS operators were also trained by the British, including 
the Jedburgh program (three-man Special Operations [SO] teams that jumped into 
France, Holland, and Belgium on or after D-Day) (O’Donnell, 2004, pp.12-13).  The Jeds 
were each handpicked and went through a rigorous training program.  Their expertise 
included demolitions, communications, training of partisans, and intelligence work.  The 
Jeds took on an advisory role and acted as rallying points for the Resistance (culturally 
immersed local personnel).  Fourteen of these Jed teams, along with the British SAS 
(Special Air Service), organized 20,000 members of the Resistance, and as a result of 
their efforts large numbers of Germans were tied down in open battles (O’Donnell, 2004, 
p.176).  They also generated intelligence on one of the last key German held bridges (not 
demolished) at Nijmengen which ultimately resulted in US forces capturing it and using 
it to move heavy armored vehicles and personnel across an otherwise impassable river 
system (O’Donnell, 2004, p. 213). 
OSS operators utilized cultural immersion to move within societies and develop 
reliable information networks, thus enabling them to gather viable code-breaking 
information on programs such as the German Enigma.  One female operator’s efforts 
included obtaining cipher information from a turned Italian admiral, which was then used 
to assess the Italian fleet activities and ultimately disable the Italian Navy for the duration 
of the war. 
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Other activities early on in the war included work by an OSS-managed group 
known as Murphy’s “Twelve Apostles.”  Its personnel included Colonel William Eddy, 
who possessed optimal cultural immersion skills.  Eddy was born in Syria of missionary 
parents; he spoke fluent Arabic and was a scholar and war hero from WWI (O’Donnell, 
2004, p. 31).  This OSS team was responsible for successfully recruiting informants and 
organizing intelligence gathered on ports, landing beaches, and key military targets in 
North Africa in support of Operation Torch, November 8, 1942. 
One of the most daunting tasks for Donovan was attempting to get OSS members 
into Germany.  Unlike France, there was no Resistance to fall back on if the operators got 
into trouble.  The actual challenge for Donovan was finding German speakers who could 
blend into German society.  The OSS London Labor Desk suggested using some of the 
hundreds of German Communist exiles in England.  Some of the operators chosen were 
anti-Nazis with a background in German underground movements.  They were 
parachuted into Germany and established networks of trusted agents and supporters.  
They gathered intelligence on potential landing zones for air borne assaults and German 
troop movements. 
2. China-Burma-India (CBI) 
In Burma and South-East Asia operations, personnel were selected because of 
their backgrounds, language skills, and levels of cultural immersion in the region.  The 
man selected to be the Commander of all US forces in the China-Burma-India was Major 
General Joseph Stilwell.  Stilwell was an excellent choice from a cultural immersion 
standpoint.  He had spent 13 years in China and spoke fluent Mandarin.  He was 
constrained in the numbers and types of forces he had at his disposal, but through 
resourcefulness and a proposal supplied by the OSS, a detachment of men was formed 
with the mission of training, deploying, and supporting native agents in conducting 
intelligence gathering and direct action (DA) guerilla warfare against the Japanese (Ward, 
1991, p. 17). 
Detachment 101 of the OSS, formed April 14, 1942, was one of the first units in 
US Military history to be created with the express purpose of operating behind enemy 
lines.  Detachment 101 recruited men with knowledge of the languages and cultures of 
the Far East, and skills in logistics, military science and tactics, engineering, 
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communications, medicine, photography, explosives, parachuting, and flying aircraft 
(Ward, 1991, p. 15).  One of the early realizations the US forces had was “a white 
American, even with the cleverest of make-up, would be sure to attract attention” (Peers 
& Brelis, 1963, p. 59). The US forces worked closely with the British and the refugees 
drawn from camps to train natives who could then be re-introduced undetected and 
provide intelligence, communications, and sabotage activities in support of Detachment 
101’s efforts.  The idea, while novel in its approach, unfortunately failed.  It did, 
however, set precedence for follow-on Detachment 101 activities involving natives. 
The even though few Detachment 101 personnel spoke the Burmese languages 
they still managed to work very closely with the native Kachin hill tribesmen.  US 
personnel learned to fight and survive in the jungles while they coordinated training and 
arming and deployment of the Kachins.  By the end of 1943, Detachment 101 had six 
intelligence bases and during 1944 and early 1945, guerilla forces expanded to 10,800. 
Detachment 101 was fortunate.  Its members had more than a year to build 
an intelligence base before they were required to conduct guerilla warfare.  
That was a tremendous advantage, because with this intelligence base they 
always knew more about the enemy that the enemy did about them. 
(Ward, 1991, p. 18) 
Detachment 101 also had the advantage that the people living in the areas they 
first had to infiltrate were the Kachins, a people whose loyalties had already been 
established through American and Irish missionary work.  Detachment 101 also used the 
Kachins to their full combat potential by assigning them duties they were trained and 
outfitted to accomplish:  guerilla tactics in a jungle environment. 
Detachment 101 was able to accomplish a difficult task through the use of 
culturally immersed and regionally adept personnel. 
They provided 75 percent of all the intelligence from which the 10th Air 
Force chose its targets and 85 percent of all the intelligence received by 
Stillwell’s Northern Combat Area Command.  Detachment 101 infiltrated 
162 native agent/radio teams into Burma by air, sea, and land.  The 
guerilla forces and sabotage teams killed 5,428 Japanese Army members, 
wounded an estimated 10,000 more, captured 78 Japanese prisoners, 
demolished 57 bridges, derailed nine trains, destroyed or captured 272 
vehicles, and destroyed 15,000 tons of Japanese supplies. 
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(Ward, 1991, pp. 19-20) 
In this regard, there is one key point to be made about the importance of knowing 
the people you are working with, as the British learned the hard way in Nagaland (north-
east India).  They elected to recruit and Kukis tribesmen into their Assam Rifles, instead 
of other local Naga tribesmen.  The British thought the Kukis were of better fighting 
stock than the Nagas.  The British, however, had forgotten that the British government 
had put down a Kukis uprising in 1917, a fact the Kukis had not forgotten and because of 
which they went almost completely over to the Japanese side (Thompson, 2001, p. 386). 
C. OSS AND MODERN DAY NSW 
NSW, specifically, can trace a connection to the OSS’s Maritime Unit (MU) and 
its Operational Swimmer Groups (OSG).  The MU was created in the summer of 1943.  
Its mission was “infiltration of agents and operatives by sea, the waterborne supply of 
resistance groups, execution of maritime sabotage, and the development of special 
equipment and devices to effectuate the foregoing” (O’Donnell, 2004, p. 124).  With the 
creation of the OSG, missions expanded to include underwater sabotage, hydrographic 
reconnaissance for amphibious assaults, reconnaissance work, and a host of maritime 
special operations. 
In addition to maritime-related missions, some of the units assigned to MU/OSS, 
specifically the MU/OSS Eighth Army Detachment, conducted demolition raids 100 
miles behind enemy lines, infiltrated for special reconnaissance (SR) on enemy defenses, 
and worked with partisans to report on targets for artillery and bombing, as well as 
gathering intelligence.  Besides the European Theater, the MU also worked as far east as 
Burma.  These MUs were assigned to Detachment 101.  The Detachment 101 MUs’ jobs 
were coastal SR, delivery of agents, hydrographic reconnaissance of landing beaches, and 
underwater probes for minefields.  The MUs were sent into countries that spoke Burmese 
or Japanese.  But unlike some of their Detachment 101 land counterparts, the MUs were 
not proficient in language skills.  One former operator mentioned that he and a teammate 
were conducting waterborne reconnaissance when they came across natives in an 
outrigger.  Neither of them had the language or cultural immersion skills to communicate 
with them and viable intelligence that might have been otherwise gathered was lost given 
the language barrier (O’Donnell, 2004, p. 140). 
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IV. WHAT CULTURAL IMMERSION MEANT FOR NSW 
DURING THE VIETNAM WAR 
Just remember this:  communist guerillas hide among the people.  If you 
win the people over to your side, the communist guerillas have no place to 
hide, you can find them.  Then as military men, [you can] fix them...finish 
them. 
         COL. Edward G. Lansdale, US Army 
   Devised Counterinsurgency Training for Vietnam 
         (Sasser, 2002, p. 67, emphasis added) 
 
A. VIETNAM:  A SYNOPSIS OF WHAT WAS TO BECOME THE 
WATERSHED FOR MODERN DAY NSW FORCES  
Many of the mission profiles of today’s NSW forces draw their origins from the 
Vietnam-era SEALs, UDTs, and NSW Riverine Special Boat Units.  Vietnam and the 
operating conditions it presented were challenging enough (such as those found in the 
mangrove-swamps of Rung Sat Special Zone), but to inject an enemy that could 
effectively blend equally well into the countryside or the urban centers presented even 
greater challenges to all US forces fighting in that country.  President Kennedy expressed 
a concern about the US forces having to contend with such an elusive adversary.  He 
directed that each of the US military services (Army, Air Force, and Navy) develop 
organic forces capable of dealing with the guerilla-insurgent-subversive threat. 
Responding to President Kennedy’s desire for the Services to develop an 
Unconventional Warfare (UW) capability, the U.S. Navy established 
SEAL Teams ONE and TWO in January of 1962. Formed entirely with 
personnel from Underwater Demolition Teams, the SEALs mission was to 
conduct counterguerilla warfare and clandestine operations in maritime 
and riverine environments. 
SEAL involvement in Vietnam began immediately and was advisory in 
nature. SEAL advisors instructed the Vietnamese in clandestine maritime 
operations. SEALs also began a UDT-style training course for the Biet Hai 
Commandos, the Junk Force Commando platoons, in Danang. 
In February 1966, a small SEAL Team ONE detachment arrived in 
Vietnam to conduct direct-action missions. Operating out of Nha Be, in 
the Rung Sat Special Zone, this detachment signaled the beginning of a 
SEAL presence that would eventually include 8 SEAL platoons in country 
on a continuing basis. Additionally, SEALs served as advisors for 
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Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU) and the Lien Doc Nguoi Nhia, or 
LDNN, the Vietnamese SEALs. The last SEAL platoon departed Vietnam 
on 7 December 1971. The last SEAL advisor left Vietnam in March 1973. 
The UDTs again saw combat in Vietnam while supporting the 
Amphibious Ready Groups. When attached to the riverine groups the 
UDTs conducted operations with river patrol boats and, in many cases, 
patrolled into the hinterland as well as along the riverbanks and beaches in 
order to destroy obstacles and bunkers. Additionally, UDT personnel acted 
as advisors. 
(Commander United States Naval Special Warfare Command, no date) 
There were a number of valuable lessons learned from these NSW pioneers who 
conducted special operations during the war in Vietnam.  These lessons included the 
importance of developing and utilizing proven standard operating procedures (SOPs) and 
the value added by working with culturally immersed and networked personnel in the 
regions in which the NSW units had to function and operate.  In some cases the NSW 
operators immersed themselves, in a limited fashion, within the local cultures. 
B. NWIP 29-1:  THE MISSION OF THE “SEAL TEAMS IN NAVAL 
SPECIAL WARFARE” IN VIETNAM 
The missions of the SEALs in Vietnam were laid out as follows: 
1. To develop a specialized capability for sabotage, demolition, and 
other clandestine activities conducted in and from restricted 
waters, rivers, and canals.  Specially to be able to destroy enemy 
shipping, harbor facilities, bridges, railway lines, and other 
installations in maritime areas and riverine environments.  Also to 
protect friendly supply lines, installations, and assets in maritime 
and riverine environments from similar attack. 
2. To infiltrate and/or exfiltrate agents, guerillas, evaders, and 
escapees. 
3. To conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and other intelligence-
gathering activities. 
4. To accomplish limited counterinsurgency civic action tasks that are 
normally incidental to counterguerilla operations.  Possibilities 
include medical aid… 
5. To organize, train, assist, and advise the United States, Allied, and 
other friendly military or paramilitary forces in the conduct of any 
of the above tasks. 
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6. To develop doctrine and tactics for such operations. 
7. To develop support equipment, including special craft. 
(Dockery, 1991, p. 106) 
For the NSW forces assigned to these missions it seemed a daunting task.  How to 
identify threats and gather intelligence in an unfamiliar battlespace? How to conduct 
missions not previously conducted by these newly formed units? Who were the reliable 
indigenous forces (if any) that the NSW units could count on for assistance in intelligence 
gathering and subsequent execution of these missions? 
C. NSW FRIENDS AND ALLIES FROM UNUSUAL RESOURCES 
Both North and South Vietnam were divided into provinces, administrative units 
that served much the same role as states do in the US.  These provinces were not large—
about the actual size of counties in the US—but they each had their own localized 
government that reported to the national government in Saigon. 
For military purposes, the forty-four provinces of South Vietnam were 
divided into four military regions or corps.  Farthest north was I 
Corps…The center of South Vietnam held II Corps, covering the largest 
land area.  III Corps included the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ) as part of 
its area as well as Saigon.  And the south, the Mekong Delta (the “Delta”) 
made up the IV Corps. 
(Dockery, 2002, p. 209) 
The first step in NSW success was getting to know who the players were in these 
four Vietnam regions that constituted the battlespace.  To accomplish this task they were 
assigned to work with a variety of Vietnamese and Vietnamese-composite units.  Some of 
the most effective units were the LDNN, PRU, and Hoi Chanhs through the Chieu Hoi 
Program.  These local units were networked from the smallest hamlet to the larger village 
to the district to the key points throughout given provinces. 
Lien Doc Nguoi Nhai (LDNN) is Vietnamese for “soldiers who fight under the 
sea.” They were established by the South Vietnamese government in July, 1961 
(Dockery, 1991, p. 101).  The South wanted to establish units with capabilities similar to 
those of the US UDTs.  There were some initial reservations from the US.  When the US 
finally authorized US instructor cadres to train the LDNN, the decision was made to train 
38
them not as UDTs but instead as SEALs.  The reasoning behind this decision was SEALs 
were more versed in the ways of guerilla tactics. 
One SEAL, after working with LDNN trainees, observed “like most Asians, 
Vietnamese are accommodating people eager to please…” (Boehem & Sasser, 1997, p. 
236).  He took advantage of this character trait and motivated his LDNN to train hard 
with positive results.  Most of the SEAL advisers, in the various case studies, pointed out 
that the LDNN were enthusiastic fighters who provided the much needed linguistic 
support the NSW forces needed to interact with local populations.  They also had a better 
perspective, than any US adviser could obtain, regarding the general lay of the land and 
enemy situation.  They also provided on-scene translation skills to SEALs in 
reconnaissance lay-up points.  “While some South Vietnamese units had a poor 
reputation, this was not the case with the effective LDNNs” (Jordan, 2003, p. 106).  The 
SEALs liked working with the LDNN and developed solid bonds of friendship and trust 
with these Vietnamese commandos. 
In one account, Kevin Dockery cites a SEAL who commented, “the LDNN were 
very good fighters in my opinion” (2002, p. 58). 
In the course of a mission, a fire fight with VC (Viet Cong) erupted, and 
the LDNN patrol leader named Tich [working with this former SEAL and 
a LDNN adviser] was shot and killed.  The SEAL continued the 
discussion describing the fact that he was friends with Tich and had even 
attended Tich’s wedding.  Now he had ‘to carry Tich’s body back to his 
people for the funeral.’ 
(Dockery, 2002, p. 60) 
SEALs have a mutual agreement that if a fellow SEAL goes down in the field, 
wounded or killed, he will be returned home regardless of the risks.  The SEAL above 
provided this same courtesy to his foreign counterpart, thereby treating him as an equal 
and demonstrating the close relationships developed between these units. 
Provisional Reconnaissance Units (PRU).  The PRU were direct action units 
developed to support counterguerilla activities and eventually the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s (CIA) Phoenix Program (established in July 1967). 
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The forerunner of the Phoenix, known as Phung Hoang among the 
Vietnamese, was the Intelligence Collection and Exploitation Program 
(ICEX), developed by the CIA in the mid-1960’s with the aim of putting 
the Viet Cong political organization under pressure.  By the time ICEX 
evolved into. . . Phoenix, it was neutralizing 800 VCI every month through 
VCI defection, prisoner snatches, and ambushes. 
(Sasser, 2002, p. 190, emphasis added) 
The Phoenix program was an effort to collect intelligence and interdict key VC 
Infrastructure (VCI) and National Liberation Front (NLF) members.  Some of the key 
VCI included VC administrators, couriers, coordinators, tax collectors, planners, and 
politicians (Constance & Fuerst, 1997, p. 250). 
Contrary to the popular impression, the PRUs did not specialize in covert 
assassination, though they did target specific VC leaders for abduction and 
capture.  By detaining and questioning the captives, the US advisers and 
other intelligence collection resources were able to obtain information 
leading to further VCI interception.  There were occasions that if the PRU 
could not net their targets, they often killed them in open combat. 
(Bosiljevac, 1990, p. 70) 
The SEALs coined two phrases relating to this subject:  “Anyone can just go in 
there and kill someone…[but] you can’t get information from a corpse” (Dockery, 1991, 
p. 160, emphasis added). 
US SEALs were utilized extensively as “advisers” to the PRU.  The PRU drew its 
members from multiple sources.  The majority were Vietnamese; there were also a large 
number of Humong (montagnards) from the mountains, Cambodians from across the 
border, some Chinese, and even deserters from the Army of the Republic of Vietnam 
(ARVN).  The ARVN deserters were drawn by the higher pay offered by the PRUs as 
well as the chance to defend their home areas (Dockery, 1991, p. 209).  Some of the 
“indigenous PRUs were a hardened lot of warriors; many were criminals who chose to 
fight for the South rather then waste away in a Vietnamese jail” (Bosiljevac, 1990, p. 70). 
Each province in the delta had its own PRU, and with the exception of the 
one in Chau Doc, they were advised by SEALs.  Most SEAL platoon 




[The PRUs also contained former VC.] 
…who had decided life was better on the other side.  They knew what was 
happening in their area, and they always had more information than they 
could act on, so we [referring to SEALs] often did operations they 
couldn’t. 
(Gormly, 1999, p. 122) 
The Phoenix/ICEX programs provided a logical processing structure for the field 
intelligence that was coming in, as well as allowing the military to take advantage of the 
supply of informants through the Chieu Hoi Program.  The intelligence gathered by the 
SEALs and PRUs was collated and analyzed by a joint Vietnamese/US team at each 
province headquarters before it was sent to higher commands.  “Each province had a 
Province Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (PIOCC) that reported its findings 
to the District Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC) that reported its 
findings to Saigon” (Dockery, 1991, p. 209). 
Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program and Hoi Chanhs.  The Chieu Hoi program 
was another force provider for the Phoenix Program.  In the case of the Chieu Hoi 
program North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and VC deserters (many of whom were ranking 
members of the VCI) were given amnesty if they “chieu hoied” or agreed to work for the 
South.  They were paid bounties for major information and weapons turned in.  From 
then on they were referred to as Hoi Chanhs and inducted into the PRU as well.  The Hoi 
Chanhs functioned as guides to cache sites, point men, VCI interceptors, and jungle 
fighters.  They also provided information about things such as enemy troop movements 
and leadership meetings.  Their efforts, when combined with NSW and PRU forces, 
resulted in some outstanding intelligence resources straight from the VCI as well as a 
ready trained fighting force. 
Local VC would be returned to their homes and families.  The program 
was amazingly successful during the ten years of its existence from 1963 
to 1973, and almost 160,000 VC and NVA took advantage of it, according 
to US records. 
(Dockery, 2002, p. 209) 
The SEAL advisers to the PRU and Hoi Chanhs trained and developed close 
working relationships and bonds of exceptional trust with both groups just as they did 
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with the LDNN.  They lived amongst them and spent time getting to know things about 
them.  They would “watch each other’s back” so to speak.  There are several cases 
discussed by Vietnam SEALs where the level of trust and mutual respect was high. 
One SEAL, for instance, quoted by Walton and Dockery had this to say: 
Keeping the PRU’s trust was important to me…they always knew I would 
back them up.  I ate with the PRUs down in the little restaurant in Nha Be.  
The men knew I would work with them, eat with them, and never abandon 
them…my PRUs knew that I would always back them, and that trust 
helped make for a very effective unit.   
If you were going to get your men’s respect, you had to live, eat, sleep, 
and fight right alongside them…To be a good adviser, you had to become 
one of the men you were leading, at least in spirit.  Those PRUs would do 
things for us that other advisers just wouldn’t believe. 
(Watson & Dockery, 1993, pp. 215-216) 
From another SEAL: 
I had a PRU whom I entrusted my life with.  His name was Bia’ (Ba-A), 
and I quickly promoted him to PRU chief.  Bia’ had been a VC company 
commander, and his skills and abilities were superb.  Our team developed 
a close camaraderie and dependency on one another. 
One of the ways I protected my men involved health care.  I saw to it my 
wounded PRUs were admitted into American, and not Vietnamese, 
hospitals.  Again, corruption was rampant…it was a ‘crapshoot’ as to 
whether someone would live or not if they had even a moderate wound.  
When they recovered I personally returned to the American Hospital to 
pick them up… Had they been sent to a local hospital…who knows. 
It was important to me to personally meet with the relatives of my 
wounded PRUs.  Unfortunately, the only person bringing food into their 
homes were the men who’d just been shot.  ‘Please tell them not to worry 
about their husbands; they’ll be alright,’ I instructed my interpreter.  ‘Tell 
them they’re being well taken care of at the American hospital, and will be 
home soon.  Also,’ I said as I reached out with an envelope, ‘tell them here 
is their husband’s money.  This should take care of them for the time 
being.’ 
Overjoyed, the women thanked me profusely.  Before long, the wounded 
PRUs were back.  Because I treated my men like they were ‘number one,’ 
they devoted themselves to me.  Their loyalty was beyond question. 
(Constance & Fuerst, 1997, pp. 259-260) 
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This latter SEAL learned that the Vietnamese do not understand US sarcasm.  
When he complained, in jest, to one of his ex-VC security guards that his gun wasn’t 
properly cleaned, the guard took such offense (at the perceived disgrace) that he told the 
SEAL if the gun was not up to par then to shoot him with the “less then perfect weapon;” 
the SEAL declined the invitation (Constance & Fuerst, 1997, p. 257). 
In an interview, Mr. Donald Crawford (Vietnam Veteran SEAL and former 
historian for the Naval Special Warfare Command) stated that some of the most valuable 
information came from the Hoi Chanhs and other local informants provided through the 
Chieu Hoi Processing Centers.  Mr. Crawford went on to describe the value of simple 
acts such as having tea, eating a meal, or just socializing with local populations and how 
these could yield windfall results.  Gestures of medical and other forms of aid also helped 
to enhance NSW operators’ standings in the local communities.  In some cases, helping a 
local family would result in a “one-on-one” contract being established.  Simply put, trust 
was developed between the NSW operator and his LDNN translator with those they just 
provided aid to.  Translators were essential, for most SEALs, to break down language 
barriers.  Attempting to learn the local cultures and customs also helped.  It demonstrated 
the NSW member’s resolve to help the local hamlet or village. 
According to Mr. Crawford, with this social interaction (social networking) local 
routines could be established.  NSW operators armed with the knowledge of how the 
local population functioned provided insights or actionable intelligence on VC 
movements and activities that were occurring in the local provinces.  Sometimes the 
intelligence was so reliable actions were taken immediately.  He stated “we would go 
down to the local Chieu Hoi Processing Center asking about suspect VC, and informants 
at the center would state they had just seen the VC in question and we would go to the 
location the informants gave us and roll up the guy we were looking for.”  On other 
occasions, Mr. Crawford and the NSW units he was assigned to would receive 
information on weapons or medical supply cache sites and uncover those. 
Mr. Crawford confirmed that the LDNN and local PRU were instrumental in 
getting into local information nets.  Between the LDNN, PRU, and Hoi Chanhs the 
intelligence was much more detailed and actionable from these sources than “dated” 
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intelligence provided by some of the Navy Intel Liaison Officers (NILOs) Mr. Crawford 
had previously contended with.  He stressed how crucial solid turnover and introductions 
were to local information sources, particularly between outbound SEALs/PRU advisors 
and their inbound adviser reliefs in order to maintain effective information flows.  
Mutual Trust, not only with the indigenous military forces but with the local 
populations, was above all else the vital key to success for all the intelligence networks 
and subsequent NSW missions 
Biet Hai.  Besides organic riverine boat assets, NSW operators and their PRU and 
LDNN forces also worked with a wooden-hulled indigenous Vietnamese junk force, the 
Biet Hai, for mobility in and around the numerous waterways.  The Biet Hai also 
provided intelligence.  The Biet Hai were a “ragtag bunch of river pirates, mostly former 
VC, that no one wanted or trusted” that with effort “had been turned into a formable band 
of cutthroats whose exploits…caught the attention of both friend and foe in the Delta” 
(Mekong Delta) (Boehm & Sasser, 1997, p. 235). 
One SEAL recounted a religious cultural experience that involved a new location 
for a junk base.  It involved breaking ground for a new base, Junk Base 33, after the 
previous base had been overrun. 
The chosen site was a malaria-looking mud and sand beach backed by old 
clearings and trails through the jungle.  Nearby was an ancient cemetery 
where vines crept around molded and cracked tombstones and crawled up 
the giant face of a neglected stone Buddha with its nose broken off. 
(Boehm & Sasser, 1997, p. 26) 
The Vietnamese forces were upset with the new location and seemed to panic at 
the sight of the cemetery.  After a few days most of the Vietnamese force abandoned the 
new site and moved on.  A few days later a friendly Buddhist monk explained the 
situation to the SEAL and others in charge of the new installation: 
Most Vietnamese people as well as the mountain people believe in the 
religion of animism.  They believe in ghosts and spirits of the dead.  They 
are most afraid of the spirits called Pratas.  The cemetery in question is the 
kind of burial grounds where Pratas rise.  Pratas are unattended and 
uncared-for spirits who have died violently through accident or war or 
who, in the case of women, have died without fulfilling their mission of 
bearing children.  They are angry, greedy, deceptive, and unpredictable 
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spirits-just like mankind.  They are hostile to individuals, to families, and 
to communities.  That is why the people fled. 
(Boehm & Sasser, 1997, p. 27, emphasis added) 
Knowledge about these religious beliefs and the Vietnamese concerns about 
spirits would be used over and over again to the SEALs’ advantage with stories generated 
by the VC and perpetuated by the SEALs about the “men with green faces.”  The SEALs, 
in comparative size to the average VC or any Vietnamese for that matter, were 
considerably larger.  When they conducted their raids and ambushes, they would strike 
hard and fast, and would wear camouflage face paint to conceal their faces.  To the VC, it 
appeared as though these large “devils or evil spirits” with green faces were rising up out 
of the jungle and taking people away to parts unknown.  This had a significant effect on 
the morale of the VCI. 
Father Hoa (Wa) and his network.  In war there are a certain number of 
fortuitous meetings or pairings that occur.  In Vietnam this was the case with the SEALs, 
their LDNN and PRUs, and a Chinese Catholic priest named Father Hoa.  Father Hoa is a 
legend among the SEALs who fought in Vietnam.   He left China with Chiang Kai-shek, 
and unlike Chiang, who went to Taiwan, Father Hoa went to Vietnam, where he was 
given jurisdiction over the village of Hai Yen, in Ca Mau.  The Father, a staunch anti-
communist, initiated many improvements to build up the town over the years and taught 
the locals to resist communism.  He is credited for actually killing VC infiltrators (Sasser, 
2002, p. 93). 
During the Vietnam War Hai Yen became a secure hamlet from which the SEALs 
could operate. 
The Father had also formed his own small army of indigenous fighters, 
who operated virtually independent of government control.  Father Hoa 
had a greater knowledge of unconventional warfare in Southeast Asia than 
any military unit in Vietnam.  He had also established an extensive 
intelligence network, all of which he willingly shared with the SEALs… 
Most of Father Hoa’s fighters were ex-Viet Cong or former soldiers of the 
North Vietnamese army (NVA) whom the priest had converted from 
communist to fighters of communism.  No VC who came to Hai Yen with 
weapons slung would be accosted.  He was given a meal, extra rations, 
medical attention if needed, and occasionally a little money. 
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(Father Hoa’s rule.)  Then Father Hoa would take the man aside.  ‘If you 
come back again,’ he advised, ‘it is obvious that the people you work for 
cannot pay or take care of you.  If you return, then you work for me.  The 
job is here if you want to stay now, or come back later.  If you come back 
again, there is no choice—you will work for me.’ 
      (Sasser, 2002, p. 93) 
Father Hoa’s forces were never in short supply of weapons or ammunition.  It was 
suspected that Father Hoa’s arms, received through “unofficial channels,” might have 
come directly from VC arms caches (Watson & Dockery, 1993, p. 250).  The father was 
exceptionally well connected.  Superb point men and agents were supplied to the SEALs 
by Father Hoa.  One SEAL recounted that Father Hoa had convinced a former NVA 
company commander to work with the SEALs:   
One of the men he gave to lead us in on any op…had obviously been at 
war most of his life…his deliberate movements showed that he had lived 
in a hostile environment for some time…The man ended up being one hell 
of a point man.  He scouted for us a number of times and led us through 
some bad areas.  He knew all the signs of booby traps, caches, and safe 
trails.  He should have—he’d been an NVA company commander before 
joining Father Wa’s group! 
(Watson &  Dockery, 1993, pp. 261-262) 
There were instances where the intelligence (or its source) was not reliable or 
trustworthy.  On one occasion an enemy agent was used in an attempt to set up a SEAL 
Platoon during a mission.  Through sound situational awareness (SA) the SEALs were 
able to ascertain that the target was questionable.  The mission was scrubbed and the 
SEALs returned to their base of operations.  The SEAL, recalling the situation, suggested 
that when the agent was discovered that Father Hoa’s people took care of the agent 
permanently. 
There were other unrelated SEAL stories about Hoi Chanhs on occasion 
still being loyal to the North and attempting to assassinate fellow Hoi 
Chanhs working with the SEALs. “…the number two Hoi Chanh 
eventually confessed, with physical encouragement …, that he had been 
assigned to assassinate Delta Platoon’s now ‘Number One’ trustworthy 
Hoi Chanh guide.’” 
(Smith & Maki, 1994, p. 297) 
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The SEALs operating with Father Hoa’s irregulars were credited as being the 
some of the most effective combat units operating in Vietnam.  Father Hoa was also 
credited with “knowing more about UW than the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the 
Special Forces, even the SEALs ever thought of knowing; and he built up all of this 
himself…”(Watson & Dockery, 1997, p. 273). 
Viet Cong.  There are other cases were ex-VC and ex-NVA (or Hoi Chanhs), 
were used as personal body guards.  Active VC were even utilized or contacted on 
occasion to develop a better understanding of the situation in Vietnam.  In one instance, 
an acting SEAL Team commander actually became friends with a local VC commander. 
On weekends he (the SEAL acting Team commander) would visit villages 
in the area east of Saigon and treat those who were ill.  In the process he 
met a man named Minh…who turned out to be the commander of the local 
Viet Cong battalion.  The two became friends. 
Minh drove a cab in Saigon when he wasn’t engaged in combat…The 
SEAL would climb into his cab and they headed for Cholon, the Chinese 
section of Saigon where few Americans ventured.  They managed to 
converse in a mixture of French, English, and Vietnamese. 
‘We’d talk.  We’d eat.  I respected him more than some of the people I 
was working with…I learned a lot about their thinking and learned to 
respect them, to admire them…’ 
(Kelly, 1993, p. 130) 
It was not uncommon to have previously captured VC working for SEALs.  Those 
captured on day one, might being carrying a radio day two, and by day three they might 
be walking point with a weapon in hand (Kelly, 1993, p. 153).  By living, training, and 
interacting daily with each of these irregular units, NSW (SEAL) SA increased 
significantly, and reliable information networks were developed.  The SEALs were 
rewarded in turn with a near continuous flow of intelligence that led to numerous 
leadership interdictions, arms caches captured, and other NSW related missions. 
D. ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE:  WHAT DID IT MEAN FOR THE NSW 
OPERATING IN VIETNAM? 
The VC were fighting a classic guerilla war against the ARVN.  The VCI were 
employing the “strategy of guerilla warfare that concerns not what the guerilla does but 
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how he is able to do it and, at the same time, began to legitimate the revolutionary party 
and prepare the population for accepting its ‘goal culture’” (Johnson, 1982, pp. 146-147).  
The need to better organize the intelligence efforts for attacking the VCI was 
recognized as early as 1961.  Sir Robert Thompson, serving with the British embassy in 
Saigon, South Vietnam, declared that the VCI should be the primary target of any 
counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam (Sasser, 2002, p. 190). 
Initial SEAL operations were poor and ineffective.  The SEALs would go out into 
the jungles at night for up to 48 hours and accomplish nothing. According to Orr Kelly 
(1993), “They had a lack of accurate, timely intelligence…in the early part of their 
involvement in the war, they had been forced to rely on intelligence gathered by 
others…often it was almost embarrassingly bad” (p. 151).  One SEAL recalls: 
We would often stumble, try to collide with a contact target, have a fire 
fight, try to kill a bunch of people, and then get out well before dawn.  We 
were without any Seeing Eye Dog at all.  We didn’t know what sounds 
were.  We didn’t know which parts of hamlets were trouble…The idea of 
working with knowledgeable, relatively well-trained counterguerilla-type 
personnel was of tremendous benefit to us. 
(Kelly, 1993, p. 161) 
After some of these failings the US took active steps to follow Sir Robert’s 
declaration.  The pairings of the US SEALs and the afore-mentioned Vietnamese units 
are evidence of this.  The SEALs were provided with intelligence when available from 
the CIA and other government sources such as the NILOs, but it was their ability to 
establish their networks at the local level or enhance pre-existing networks that was their 
real strength. 
The SEALS, well armed with a ready supply of intelligence, could utilize their 
war fighting assets to include their own advanced land warfare and waterborne skills 
(small arms, medical, communications, demolitions, hand-to-hand combat, navigation, 
small boat, swimming, diving, air operations, some language, etc.).  SEALs were thus 
able to capitalize on intelligence rapidly (almost immediately) and effectively.  NSW 
SOPs allowed the SEALs to achieve repeat performances. 
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Because of our technique of operating, the ferocity of how we did our job, 
and the tactics we used, we were very much like the VC themselves, only 
better.  We were much more aggressive.  Since we had learned just how 
the VC were successful, and saw that it worked, we copied it.  The action 
resulted in extremely high kill ratios of VC to SEALs lost during the 
war—in our favor. 
(Dockery, 2002, p. 189) 
The SEALs are credited with “being one of the only US units in Vietnam with the 
ability to gather their own intelligence, conduct a combat operation based on that 
intelligence, and then analyze the results, all with the blessing from those in higher 
authority” (Dockery, 1991, p.216).  In many cases the intelligence from the targets or 
gleaned from en route portions of the mission resulted in follow-on missions being 
generated.  The SEALs, with proper intelligence, could operate better, faster, and more 
safely. 
One SEAL notes: 
From about the middle to the end of my tour, we started trying to run 
operations off of the intelligence net we developed.  This was information 
we received either from people we had captured or from intelligence 
structures that existed in the delta, on both the US Navy’s and South 
Vietnamese sides.  So we switched from just going out and doing 
ambushing to actually trying to target specific Viet Cong leaders in their 
home, hamlets, villages, or whatever. 
Operating from our own ‘self-intelligence’ was kind of a unique situation 
for us as the first SEALs to operate in the Mekong Delta.  In fact, we were 
the only US forces actually doing ops on the ground in the delta area for a 
while…Every time we went out on an operation, we gathered further 
intelligence for ourselves as well as for others. 
(Dockery, 2002, p. 98, emphasis added) 
The SEALs would pass on critical information to larger forces such as the Army 
and the Navy, but they were cautious in passing too much information out of concern for 
possible compromise by faulty information security systems in the US/Vietnamese 
intelligence centers. 
Frequently, we had intelligence critical to the success of another op we 
were set to go on, so we kept it to ourselves.  It was like finding gold.  We 
didn’t want to lose our strategy to the press.  If we let it go to NILO, 
sooner rather than later our information invariably hit the streets.  Once it 
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was of no further value to us, we let it go.  Initially, we tried passing on 
information early, and it nearly got us killed in an ambush. 
(Constance & Fuerst, 1997, p. 258) 
It was reported that the VCI in some 16 provinces of IV Corps ceased to function 
as an entity due to continuous pressure exerted by the SEALs and their PRUs applied 
(Dockery, 2002, p. 210).  VC tax collectors were a particularly rich target for the SEALs, 
LDNN, and their PRUs.  They represented higher level leadership in the VCI.  Their role 
was to force villagers to pay money or goods as VC-levied taxes.  Tax collectors had to 
know a lot about the province they operated in to do their job.  SEALs considered this a 
good snatch and grab operation. 
“Since he was high up in the infrastructure, we could get good information from 
him; and that was our basic objective, eliminating the VCI and gathering information on 
the higher-ups and their operations…thus choke off a source of supply for the VC”( 
Dockery, 2002, p. 216).  If other vital information was obtained, such as about large troop 
movements at specific times that information was passed onto the Army or Navy for 
action. 
For the SEALs who worked with Father Hoa, the intelligence provided was top-
notch.  The SEALs working at the tip of Ca Mau Peninsula amazed their superiors with 
continuous flows of high-ranking VC captives. 
Sometimes their intelligence was so good that they would wait at the side 
of a canal, knowing that a sampan carrying VC leaders would come along 
at a certain time.  ‘The people we were looking for came down the canal at 
the time they were supposed to.  They were this close.  Just reach out and 
grab’em.  It was that easy a few times.’ 
(Kelly, 1993, p. 152) 
There were other intelligence coups that happened not by chance but by design.  
Some VCI personalities were just trying to survive the war and keep their families alive.  
In one case a SEAL was approached by an informant source he had developed.  The 
source put him in contact with a high-ranking VC who provided a lay-down of attacks 
planned against key targets and other information. 
As it turns out, the man, simply known as ‘Mister,’ was actually the 
number one man, in charge of all VC operations in the delta.  The SEAL 
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was out in the field on one occasion Mister pushed him into a hole and 
concealed him from a passing VC patrol.  Mister saved the SEALs life.  
This act and the information provided by Mister were done out of fear for 
his life and the life of his wife suffering from tuberculosis and a sick child.  
Mister had hoped to sell information for money to care for his family.  
After the defeat at Tet the VC were left to fend for themselves.  Food, 
medicine, and other survival necessities were no longer made available.  
Mister was one of those left behind. 
(Kelly, 1993, pp. 154-155) 
The SEALs, PRUs, LDNN, and Hoi Chanhs all worked closely.  They trusted 
each other on numerous occasions, to include the relatively unsuccessful “Bright Light” 
prisoner of war (POW) rescue operations and more successful combat search and rescue 
(CSAR) missions, such as the one for downed electronic warfare officer Lt. Col Iceal 
Hambleton in April 1972. 
By April, most of the US ground troops had been withdrawn and the US was 
using heavy air power to pound the NVA in support of ARVN operations.  During these 
operations the aircraft Hambleton was in was shot down over the Quang Tri Province.  
The Lt Col had a wealth of knowledge in his head about US missile forces and their 
targets.  To the VC he was a prize and bait for US rescue forces.  After several failed 
rescue attempts, resulting in more US servicemen killed in action (KIA) and with time 
running out, a mission plan was drawn up to rescue the downed airman.   A SEAL, 
named Tom Norris, and a LDNN, named Nguyen Van Kiet, dressed as local fishermen, 
paddled up the Song Mieu Giang River, at extreme risk of capture or death, to retrieve 
Hambleton.  The mission was successful and all three men made it back alive.  For their 
bravery, Norris was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor (one of three CMHs ever 
awarded to a SEAL) and Kiet was awarded the US Navy Cross (the only one ever given 
to a Vietnamese). 
Summary Results of SEAL Combat Actions in Vietnam 1966-1971: 
Enemy killed in action (KIA confirmed by body count) 1,594 
Enemy killed in action (KIA probable, body not found)    638 
Enemy captured                                  1,080 
Enemy weapons captured     over 485 
Enemy documents captured (intelligence)   over 277.5 kg 
Ratio SEAL to Enemy losses (KIA)   1 SEAL per 50 Enemy 
(Dockery,1991, p. 215) 
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The Vietnamese irregulars and paramilitary units knew the language, the people, 
and the land.  The SEALs, through the various agencies they reported to, were able to 
provide considerable financial support as well contribute the technology of modern 
warfare:  helicopters, combat riverine and sea craft, good communications, and a 
sophisticated logistics system.  By getting out into the field and local population centers, 
the SEALs were able to gain firsthand knowledge of the battlespace in which they were 
required to operate.  These incursions also allowed the SEALs to hone their SOPs which 
for many of them became literally second nature. 
The SEALs did not totally immerse themselves in the local cultures but they did 
realize the tremendous value added by using culturally immersed personnel (Vietnamese 
units and individuals previously discussed).  The SEALs used what immersion skills they 
did have to establish the levels of trust to operate with and gather information through 
these personnel. These immersed Vietnamese personnel were extremely well connected 
throughout the various provinces and provided the insider perspective required and 
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V. CULTURAL IMMERSION 
A. WHAT IS CULTURAL IMMERSION? 
Cultural immersion refers to a broad-based combination of education, training, 
and practical skills and experiences that allows its practitioner to adapt and/or become 
immersed in a particular group or society on some level.  Cultural immersion entails an 
understanding of integrated patterns of human behavior that includes thought, speech, 
action, and artifacts; the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of an ethnic, 
religious, or social group.  The fundamental objectives of cultural immersion are first, to 
develop a situational awareness (SA) in a given region, and second, to develop a network 
of trust among the local people (native, naturalized, or transient) within the region of 
interest. 
B. WHAT ARE THE TENETS OF CULTURAL IMMERSION? 
Levels of cultural immersion can be broken down into the following five levels: 
peripheral, primary, intermediate, advanced, and indigenous or native.  Each level 
depends on the proficiency of culturally immersed personnel to accomplish their given 
tasks or job assignments utilizing their knowledge/experience, which in turn depends on 
knowledge of local language(s), ideologies/religions, social interactions, 
politics/leadership, daily routines/rituals, economics, values/ethics, and region-specific 
adaptations. 
Language is the first step in cultural immersion.  It is one of the means by which 
people can identify others.  Without the means to communicate, cultural immersion is 
severely limited if not virtually impossible.  Language represents the ability to obtain or 
attain basic survival needs.  For the purpose of cultural immersion discussions, language 
is not just the ability to read, write, and speak.  Language includes the ability to 
understand the idiosyncrasies and subtleties of those using it. 
Ideology/Religion is another way to distinguish a particular group from others in 
a given region.  They both are powerful motivators to direct groups or individuals to act 
in certain ways or to carry out certain actions such as those demonstrated on September 
11, 2001.  Understanding the beliefs of a group or individual is critical for understanding 
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why the members might be motivated to act the way they do and for identifying possible 
solutions for how best to redirect their energies. 
The sum total of social interactions indicates how a society is networked.  
Social interactions establish the internal and external relationships a society must 
contend with to survive.  Internal relationships can include but are not limited: to 
families, tribes, clans, professional affiliations, local social organizations, etc.  In 
contrast, as external relations can include relations with other states, allies, enemies, 
competing countries, trading partners (import and export), etc.  Internal relations can also 
be broken down into four specific types which reflect different roles:  1) directly 
supportive (family members or teammates), 2) indirectly supportive (service providers), 
3) directly adversarial (feud relationships), or 4) indirectly adversarial (business 
competitors).  External relations follow suit with 1) directly supportive (allies), 2) 
indirectly supportive (import/export trade partners), 3) directly adversarial (anti-western 
terrorists or rogue states), or 4) indirectly adversarial (state sponsors of terrorism) roles. 
Leaders, along with the political structure, set the precedents for others to 
follow.  They provide the direction and laws, including enforcement.  They focus a 
society’s efforts and resources.  They can strongly influence social interactions, in 
addition to defining the roles of these relationships. 
Daily Routines/Rituals can set the stage for how the aforementioned cultural 
tenets all come together and inter-relate.  Routines and rituals establish the patterns of 
behavior.  They are the means by which, one may explain how and why people interact 
the way they do.  The variety of routines and rituals is extensive.  They can range from an 
individual going to and from work to mass religious gatherings with all the formalities 
and trappings. 
Economics plays a major role in how countries and, on a smaller scale, societies 
interact with one another.  Economics can be a driving force for a country’s politicians, 
and can lead them to adopt supportive or adversarial roles both internally and/or 
externally.  A strong economy when properly managed represents power, stability, and 
survival for a country.  A weak economy leads to the direct opposite. 
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Values/Ethics represent beliefs at a micro level vice the macro view that 
ideology/religion represents.  Values/ethics are core considerations for an individual who 
will use them as the basis for decisions about whether and when decisions to act or take 
no action. 
Regional Adaptations refers to the ability of an individual or group to live within 
a particular geographic and climatologically challenging region.  Such adaptations would 
include selection of clothing, shelter, and food as well as production, transportation, and 
communications.  Regions can be urban, suburban, rural, or primitive. 
C. WHAT ARE THE LEVELS OF CULTURAL IMMERSION? 
The first level of cultural immersion is peripheral immersion.  To attain this 
level requires some general education, perhaps a limited exposure to a region, some of 
the societies contained within it and their cultural aspects.  Adaptation is difficult at this 
level.  Language proficiency is negligible and interpreters will most likely be required to 
interact with the local people. 
The second level of cultural immersion is primary immersion.  This 
demands/reflects more specific education (historical, political, and religious) regarding a 
specific region of the world; several introductory trips to and around a given region, and 
interaction with local populations at a tourist level.  Language proficiency may be 
equivalent to a secondary/high school level and individuals are likely to require 
interpreter/translator assistance. 
The third level of cultural immersion is intermediate immersion.  This requires 
specialized education, about a particular region to include its politics, economics, 
culture(s), religion(s), and language(s).  Intermediate immersion entails considerable 
travel within a particular region to include staying with locals and observing (perhaps 
participating in) some local customs. Language proficiency is high—equivalent to that 
received in college or advanced language schools.  No assistance is required to function 
in the given region.  Individuals at this level can fit themselves into social networks. 
The fourth level of cultural immersion is advanced immersion.  In addition to the 
specialized education needed for intermediate immersion, advanced immersion 
concentrates more on the social sciences; to include psychology, sociology, 
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anthropology, and philosophy of the region of interest.  Advanced immersion also 
includes living in a region for extended periods of time and functioning as part of a given 
society. Advanced immersion skills include having a detailed appreciation for local 
customs, beliefs, mannerisms and thought processes.  At this level, practitioners 
participate in social networks that they can call upon to accomplish tasks. 
The fifth level of cultural immersion is indigenous or native immersion.  This is 
not something that can be taught or gained through experience.  Indigenous or native 
immersion refers to those persons born to native parents and raised in a region of interest.  
They, quite literally, are completely immersed.  They are natives and know the lay of the 
land. Though some may lack higher levels of formal education, they speak the local 
dialect/language, they think the local thought processes and, in almost all cases, they 
function comfortably/effortlessly in the local society.  These skills, coupled with their 
knowledge of the lay of the land, give them a natural ability to establish elementary to 
advanced social networks within their sphere of influence. 
D. CULTURAL IMMERSION:  IN A MILITARY CONTEXT 
Cultural immersion skills allow the military practitioner to communicate with 
indigenous or foreign personnel, civilian or military.  Cultural immersion skills are a 
means to an end.  From a military perspective they should be utilized for two purposes:  
First to gather human intelligence (HUMINT) with the insider’s perspective; Second, 
they can be used to help conduct more sophisticated, nuanced, and accurate mission 
planning and execution within a given battlespace or region. Furthermore, cultural 
immersion allows units with these capabilities to better accomplish mission essential 
coordination with other allied or indigenous paramilitary type forces. Mission essential 
coordination may include some or all of the following items: close air support (CAS), 
artillery fire support, terminal guidance operations (TGO), deconfliction (to avoid 
fratricide), other communications, and/or transportation.  Cultural immersion can also 
provide a means to gain logistics support (weapons, ammunition, food, water, shelter, 
first aid, etc.). 
Cultural immersion would also allow military practitioners to better understand 
and appreciate local Military/Warfare techniques. This speaks to immersion in a military 
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context.  For instance it would mean gaining a historical understanding of conflicts 
throughout a region.  It would also focus attention on local tactics, techniques, 
procedures, failures, and successes, as well as strategically significant sites, centers of 
gravity (COGs), critical transportation nodes, power supplies, food supplies, water 
supplies, and other potentially vital target information. 
Taking into consideration the various cultural immersion tenets listed above, 
those forces utilizing immersion skills could overcome certain barriers that unprepared 
military forces cannot cross.  The first step, language, is the most fundamental. It is the 
keystone for establishing some form of relationship with another person(s).  The next step 
is establishing a professional/working relationship.  There are several methods by which 
to achieve this, to include training, military exercises, co-planning, and actual military 
combat operations.  As forces are able to observe each others’ skill levels in the field the 
various levels of trust develop.  The third step, then, is building social relationships, such 
as some of those discussed in previous chapters, which also allow a certain degree of trust 
to develop. 
Cultural immersion capabilities do not have to entail a military unit becoming 
immersed to the advanced level.  We see this if we re-consider the cases already 
discussed.  
For instance COL Lawrence in Arabia utilized advanced immersion skills.  
Lawrence had all of the skill sets required to fulfill advanced cultural immersion to 
include a vast knowledge of the Arab culture, language(s) (including the various 
dialects), knowledge about their history, philosophy, social and military networks, and he 
was well traveled throughout that region of the world.  Lawrence’s only short coming 
was the fact that he could not physically blend in with the indigenous populations among 
whom he lived. 
In the case of the OSS in Europe, immersion was conducted at all levels of 
immersion to include indigenous or native immersion.  Those OSS units that were 
successful in utilizing their skills did so by virtue of the fact they had the same general 
appearance as the enemy forces or the neutrals caught up in the conflicts.  In some cases, 
language barriers were easily overcome.  In other cases, native born and raised German 
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expatriates were available and recruited for operations within Germany.  These same 
Germans had not been displaced for very long from their country of origin.  This is 
important, because forces trying to pass as indigenous forces or as locals may have 
difficulty in doing so if they have been out of the region and lost touch with how the local 
societies interact, how they communicate (with language idiosyncrasies), and what their 
daily routines are. 
The OSS in Burma had an entirely different set of challenges to contend with.  
They did not look at all like the natives or transients in the regions where they operated.  
Few of the OSS forces actually spoke the native languages or Japanese.  Few had any 
experience or requisite survival skills in the terrain in which they had to operate.  To 
overcome these shortcomings, the American and British forces recruited and trained local 
Kachin tribesmen to work with them and assist in executing Allied missions.  Irish 
missionaries would also allow the Allies to use the various missions’ local networks.  The 
Allied missions were quite successful by using this paired technique of peripherally and 
primary immersed operators working with indigenous or native immersed tribesmen.  
Due to the effectiveness of this technique it was used extensively by NSW personnel in 
the Vietnam War. 
When the SEALs arrived in Vietnam they had the war fighting skills to execute 
their missions, but only peripheral and primary immersion skill levels when it came to 
interacting with the Vietnamese units and indigenous personnel with whom they 
operated.  The local PRUs, LDNN, and Hoi Chanhs provided the requisite intermediate, 
advanced, indigenous or native immersion skills to gather the HUMINT or other forms of 
information to accomplish the NSW missions in Vietnam.  Just as with the OSS units in 
Burma, the SEALs would be introduced through their networks, to individuals, such as 
Father Hoa.  Father Hoa, armed with advanced immersion skills, provided outstanding 
information, forces, and situational awareness which the SEALs, again, could capitalize 
on. 
Cultural immersion is not the final ends to final means.  Rather, it is a tool or skill 
set that allows missions to develop and to be executed with smooth transitions.  It does 
not guarantee mission success but certainly assures greater mission success then 
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operating without it.  Cultural immersion allows those who possess these skills—or the 
forces they have working for them who possess these skills—to have a distinct edge over 
an adversary who doesn’t have these assets.  Cultural immersion also “evens up the 
playing field” when US or allied forces are operating in foreign lands against otherwise 
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VI. A CULTURAL IMMERSION MODEL 
A. WHO IS DOING CULTURAL IMMERSION? 
To the Army’s credit, the value of cultural immersion training has long been 
recognized as a useful force capability/enhancement. Given the Army’s mission to “hold 
and maintain territory” it makes sense that at least a portion of the Army’s personnel are 
given some form of immersion skills to function with host nation forces and local 
populations in various regions of the globe.  But it is no longer just the Army engaging in 
land warfare related operations. 
With the Global War on Terrorism expanding, and special operations forces such 
as NSW conducting more combating terrorism (CBT), direct action (DA), and special 
reconnaissance (SR) missions in hostile, semi-permissive, and benign regions, cultural 
immersion skills are a must.  The Army’s Special Forces (SF), Civil Affairs (CA), and 
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Commands provide cultural immersion training and 
resources to their people, each with there own motivations for doing so.  But which 
resource or warfare specialty has the focus on immersion skills to the fidelity that would 
allow NSW to get its forces trained to at least a primary or intermediate level of 
proficiency, and preferably the latter? If the intent is that NSW forces can better establish 
intelligence networks which, in turn, allow these NSW forces to track down and address 
the threats presented by terrorist organizations or insurgent movements in a direct and 
time sensitive manner, then it seems paramount to consider what NSW could learn—or  
borrow—from these other entities. 
After several extensive discussions at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), 
Monterey, with Foreign Area Officers (FAO) and some preliminary research about the 
program, along with attendance of a 14 June 2004 Foreign Area Officer Course (FAOC) 
briefing, I have concluded that the FAO community’s approach to training its personnel, 





B. WHAT IS THE FOREIGN AREA OFFICER PROGRAM ABOUT? 
Foreign Area Officers (FAO) are specially trained regional experts.  They are 
utilized as experts in nine major regions of the world.  They travel and become versed in 
the various countries found in each of these regions, which are: 
¾ 48B - Latin America  
¾ 48C – Europe  
¾ 48D – South Asia  
¾ 48E – Eurasia  
¾ 48F – China  
¾ 48G – Middle East / North Africa  
¾ 48H – Northeast Asia  
¾ 48I – Southeast Asia 
¾ 48J – Sub-Saharan Africa 
FAO training is well designed and systematic.  The result is advanced firsthand 
practical experiences in a given region to include the development of contacts and 
potential networks. FAOs function at an intermediate to advanced immersion level and 
are used extensively by senior commanders and other government officials, typically at 
the strategic level, when extensive regional knowledge is required. 
The objectives of the FAO program are that the qualified FAOs have the ability to 
effectively apply their foreign language training, in country training (ICT), and their 
advanced civil schooling (ACS) to:  identify and understand US interests as they apply to 
countries within the region; improve language fluency; develop a detailed knowledge of 
the region; acquire a firsthand practical sense of the country and region; and begin the 
process of building contacts within the region that will provide the officer the means to 
serve effectively in key political-military positions. 
Specific competency objectives or “domains of experience and knowledge” are 
divided into eleven areas.  They are listed below with their definitions: 
a. Regional Experience. PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE living and working 
in the region. Practical experience working with, observing, and 
experiencing the politics, economics, societies, cultures, geography, 
demography, etc. in the region. 
b. Language. FAO should test on the DLPT at 3/3 and have a professional 
knowledge of military terminology by the end of ICT, if not beforehand. 
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c. Military-to-Military Experience. Practical experience working with 
regional military personnel on real-world projects, exercises, etc.  
d. Security Assistance Activities. Practical experience and a working 
knowledge of Security Assistance programs such as Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS), International Military Education and Training (IMET), 
Humanitarian Assistance (HA), HA Excess Property (HA-EP), and 
Combined Operations & Exercises. Practical experience and a working 
knowledge of the Security Assistance Officer's (SAO) role in the 
development of the Theater Security Cooperation Plan, and his/her role in 
coordinating and de-conflicting it with the Embassy's Mission Program 
Plan.  
e. Defense Attaché Activities. Practical experience and a working 
knowledge of the roles of the Defense Attaché:  as a diplomat, the military 
advisor to the Ambassador; the representative of the Secretary of Defense, 
Service Secretaries, Service Chiefs, and agency heads; the combatant 
commander (in some countries); and a program manager.  
f. Embassy Administration. Practical experience and a working 
knowledge of an American embassy's administration and support (ex. 
General Services Office (GSO), Regional Security Office (RSO), Budget 
and Finance (B&F), Housing Committee, and International Cooperative 
Administrative Support Services (ICASS). Experience in ensuring the 
State Department system supports military customers.  
g. Combined Operations & Exercises. Practical experience and a 
working knowledge of Combined Exercises: how they are planned; how 
they are coordinated; the roles of the combatant command, embassy, and 
host nation; the execution; and post exercise considerations.  
h. Embassy Offices. Practical experience and a working knowledge of the 
functions of the other offices of the embassy, and their interaction with 
defense offices: e.g. Political, Economic, Councilor, Justice, CIA, 
Agriculture, Commercial, Legal, and USAID.  
i. Combatant Command. Practical experience and a working knowledge 
of what the combatant command does in the particular region; the 
development of the Theater Security Cooperation Plan; and the duties of 
FAOs at the theater headquarters level (in J2, J4, and J5).  
j. US Policy Goals and Formulation. Practical experience and a working 
knowledge of US policy in the region and country, how that policy is 
formulated, and how that policy is implemented. Additionally, how does 
the embassy put together its Mission Program Plan?  
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k. Regional Knowledge. Detailed ACADEMIC knowledge of the region's 
politics, militaries, foreign affairs, economics, society, culture, geography, 
demography, and "hot issues." 
(HQ, Department of the Army, DCS G-3, DAMO-SSF, 2003, pp. 5 & 6, emphasis added) 
 
FAO candidates follow a logical and well thought out training pipeline which 
includes language training, followed up by in-country training (ICT), then advanced civil 
schooling (ACS), and finish with a FAOC. 
Language training first.  The functional Area 48 conducts most initial language 
training at the Defense Language Institute at the Presidio of Monterey, Monterey, 
California.  A small number of low density languages are taught at the Foreign Service 
Institute (FSI) in Arlington, VA or through a private contractor in the greater 
Washington, DC area.  Course of instruction last from 25 to 64 weeks. 
There is a Foreign Area Officer Course (FAOC) which is also a required phase 
of training for FA-48 officers. Officers typically attend this training while attending their 
language training at the Defense Language Institute (DLI) on the Presidio of Monterey, 
CA.  This is a one-week course focusing on orienting the officer to: (1) the strategic and 
international level, (2) the FA48 career, and (3) In-Country Training (ICT). 
Next step in FAO training is FAOs they get to travel extensively, conducting In-
Country Training (ICT) in the region for which they are getting qualified to become 
experts.  The most important goal of In-Country Training (ICT) is gaining practical 
experience in living and working in the region.  Secondary goals include: honing 
language skills in real-world situations, developing contacts, and providing the credibility 
that future commanders will expect.  FAOs are provided with a sizable master list of host 
nation Command and Staff Colleges, language schools, and a variety of other advanced 
courses and visit opportunities. 
In-Country Training (ICT) is primarily focused on acquiring practical 
experience and know-how in working in your particular region while 
using your target language. ICT also provides you…an opportunity to 
learn to adapt to some of the "peculiarities" of life in your part of the 
world. Lastly, it provides you the experience and credibility that will be 
expected by your future commanders… 
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(HQ, Department of the Army, DCS G-3, DAMO-SSF, 2003, p. 5) 
Within each of their respective regions of focus, FAOs have priority countries in 
which they are encouraged to travel.   Given that FAOs are regional experts they are also 
strongly encouraged to travel—beyond adjacent countries—to peripheral countries to 
their regional sphere.  The FAO community has developed a system of tables to organize 
the established country priorities for FAO ICT travel.  Each region is divided into as 
many as three tiers in order to provide some prioritization.  However, FAOs are given 
some flexibility to determine their own priorities for regional travel based on individual 
needs. 
Each country is evaluated for a visit based on the relative political 
importance to US National Security interests, time/space/distance 
requirements, budget constraints, and current political situation. The list is 
not provided as a specific order of merit since, for example, it may be 
financially smart to visit several countries in one trip to a geographic sub-
region thus saving airfare. FAOs are also encouraged to assess countries in 
their region based on specific training objectives they are trying to 
accomplish.  
(HQ, Department of the Army, DCS G-3, DAMO-SSF, 2003, p. 23) 
 
Next, the FAO candidate attends Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS) which entails 
earning a graduate degree in regional studies.  FAOs attend an approved university, 
military or civilian, that offers the appropriate regional specialization program.  
Prospective FAOs who already possess a graduate degree must seek written approval for 
a waiver of this requirement.  There is a master list of schools made available to 
candidates. 
In this fashion the Army has put together a systematic approach to cultural 
immersion, regional expertise, situational awareness, and networking. The FAO program 
begins with a lengthy education and training period to develop officers who will serve as 
regional specialists in the grades of major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel. The Army 
makes a considerable investment in training FAOs, investing 3 to 4 1/2 years in the 
process.  The end result is individuals who are highly qualified to provide valuable real 
time information on the region in question. 
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C. WHAT FAO TRAINING DOES AND DOES NOT BRING TO THE NSW 
WAR TABLE? 
First and foremost, individuals with FAO skills can bring situational awareness 
and intelligence networks to bear, to identify and/or affect centers of gravity (COG) or 
critical nodes.  Potential NSW regional experts could provide HUMINT resources and 
potential foreign forces intelligence support for NSW missions.  Depending on their level 
of immersion they could provide the insider’s perspective.  They could also be used as 
interpreters, or at the very least, to screen interpreters.  They could be used to identify key 
political leaders, both in formal and informal networks.  If authorized, they could conduct 
time critical targeting or leadership interdiction operations and other sorts of short notice 
mission profiles.  These NSW regional experts (still operators) could provide key mission 
planning support. 
Secondary responsibility, individuals with this training could provide unit support 
roles.  These support responsibilities should be very specific in scope and designed, so as 
not to put these highly trained NSW operators into administrative roles.  Instead 
individuals with this training must be regarded as tremendous intelligence assets and 
should not to be improperly utilized. Certainly they could provide liaison capabilities 
with the host countries that NSW forces may be operating in.  They could also arrange 
translator services.  They could scout out or expedite the procurement for appropriate 
basing sites for Joint Special Operation Task Forces (JSOFT) or NSW Task Groups 
(NSWTG).  They could also assist in the procurement of indigenous transportation as 
required. 
FAOs establish standard operating procedures (SOP) within their regions.  Also, it 
not uncommon to have FAOs operating concurrently in regions with other US service 
FAOS.  These other FAOs can pass on SOPs to other personnel (i.e. NSW regional 
experts) coming into the region of interest.  These SOPs could be used for short turn 
around requirements.  SOPs represent the fundamental survival tools for NSW forces.  
NSW operators have the ability to adopt and adapt SOPs to fit their missions. 
One other important note:  FAOs are trained to operate autonomously.  
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Nevertheless, FAOs are not utilized at the operational or tactically levels…yet.  
FAO training is currently oriented so most FAOs become regional experts for unit 
commanders at the Corps level and/or theater commander staffs.  FAOs are not being 
trained to support operational level commands or below.  The Army, Air Force, and 
Marine Corps all have FAOs but there are very few Navy FAOs (perhaps none).  Army 
FAOs and attachés have a deeper appreciation for Army capabilities and requirements.  
No one—outside the NSW community—truly understands NSW capabilities and 
requirements.  A NSW regional expert could play an important liaison role within the 
joint and interagency realm.  NSW individuals with FAO training would be high value 




























VII. ANALYSIS FOR NSW CULTURAL IMMERSION 
A. REQUIREMENTS FOR NSW FORCES: CULTURAL IMMERSION IN 
HOSTILE, COMPLEX, AND UNSTABLE ENVIRONMENTS 
Complex environments contain many diverse external elements that interact 
with and influence an organization.  Under unstable conditions, environmental elements 
shift abruptly.  “Instability may occur when competitors [terrorists/insurgents] react with 
aggressive moves and countermoves (Daft, 2003, p. 55).” 
NSW is dealing with a diverse number of external factors that can be broken 
down into two broad categories, domestic and foreign.  Some of the domestic factors 
include: Government policy decisions to use SOF; US public opinion of SOF; future 
NSW roles, if any, that NSW may fill within the US Homeland Defense; USSOCOM and 
Theater Special Operations Command (SOC) mission requirements; and supporting 
missions for the US Navy, Army, Marine Corps, or Air Force. 
Some of the foreign factors include:  foreign policy of other countries; foreign 
populations; cultural differences; religious differences; host-nation support for the US 
and coalition troops; foreign government and military willingness to cooperate in NSW 
efforts.  With the foreign factors comes a great deal of uncertainty.  Hostile uncertainty 
that NSW must face, for instance, comes from current and future terrorist and extremist 
groups, as well as other unknown enemies.  Hostile uncertainty produces its own set of 
complex problems/challenges.  Challenges that NSW must address: new enemy tactics; 
new enemy objectives and goals; new enemy weapons; new methods of communications 
and intelligence gathering.  All of these factors combine to place renewed emphasis on 
NSW tactics, techniques, and procedures as they relate to NSW DA, SR, and CT 
missions. 
NSW makes up less then one percent of the U.S. Navy personnel.  NSW has 
approximately 5000 personnel total, which break down into about 2400 SEAL operators, 
600 Special Warfare Combatant Crewmen (SWCC), with the remaining personnel 
engaged in support activities (“SEALs Focus Is On Terrorism, Core Missions, 
Interoperability”, 2003).  Given these small numbers, if NSW is going to play an integral 
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part in the Global War on Terrorism it must fight smarter and even more efficiently.  The 
demands on NSW are high but historically the NSW operation success rates are also 
high.  Also, keep the “special” in Naval Special Warfare; NSW must adopt innovative 
tactics, techniques, and procedures for dealing with the new asymmetric threats posed by 
terrorists and insurgents.  Cultural immersion is a force enhancement capability that 
should be given strong consideration. 
B. NSW ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 
Is NSW equipped to handle Cultural Immersion Training requirements? The short 
answer is…“yes!”  The NSW community is over 60 years old and the Naval Special 
Warfare Command (CNSWC) has been established for 16 years.  The CNSWC and its 
subordinate commands are well organized to support one another internally. They are 
also well suited to externally support other units or headquarters.  NSW went through a 
major reorganization in the last four years to meet overseas deployment requirements.  
The result of this reorganization is increased NSW forward presence and higher authority 
requirements are more readily met.  Due to its inherent small size, NSW lacks some of 
the administration abilities that larger commands have, but it also has a reduced 
bureaucracy as a result.  New ideas and creativity are encouraged to solve problems—
such as enhancing situational and battlespace awareness, and intelligence and operational 
preparation of the battlespace.  This what cultural immersion represents. 
Subordinate to the CNSWC is the NSW community which is broken down into a 
divisional structure with six major commands: two operational war fighting commands, 
two mobility commands, one training command, and one research and development 
command.  Each one of these major commands has operational command (OPCON) over 
a range of three to ten subordinate NSW commands, known as “Teams.”  These six major 
commands each have similar departments to those of the CNSWC and provide both 
external and internal services (external services being those focused more on the 
operational levels of NSW force allocation and the internal services referring to support 
to the subordinate Teams). 
The majority of these Teams, while in the continental US (CONUS), are self-
contained to internally train and equip their own fighting elements, but require funding 
71
support from external higher authority.  The Sea Air Land (SEAL) Teams provide the 
final external tactical level NSW expertise and support for all missions related to larger 
maritime, air-to-ground, and land warfare operations.  The SEAL Teams, are the fighting 
units that carry out the actual NSW missions (DA, SR, CT, UW, PR, Hydrographic 
Reconnaissance, CD, FID, and IW as well as collateral missions such as CSAR and 
Protective Services).  The Special Boat Teams (SBT) and Swimmer Delivery Vehicle 
(SDV) Teams provide the internal mobility assets and personnel to support NSW and 
other SOF missions. 
[In reference to Command and Control]  As environmental uncertainty 
increases, organizations tend to become more organic, which means 
decentralizing authority and responsibility to lower levels…encouraging 
teamwork (Daft, 2003, p. 61). 
NSW fits the organic command and control model.  NSW follows a model of 
short vertical linkage for authorization to execute missions and a short horizontal linkage 
for supporting fires, mobility, and medical assistance.  Once a NSW Squadron 
(NSWRON) is deployed, the NSWRON commander provides the higher level 
commands with the plan of action to accomplish the mission.  While—depending on the 
mission type—authority to execute a mission resides with higher levels of authority, the 
actual execution is left to the lower level units to coordinate and accomplish.  This 
process avoids exhaustive planning, maintains operational security, and allows flexibility 
if plan modifications are required. 
Division structure works for NSW. According to Daft (2003) [referring to 
professional organizations], a divisional structure, by virtue of its size, has an inherent 
ability to maximize coordination of efforts across functional departments (p. 41).  
Additionally, the “divisional structure promotes flexibility and change due to its ability to 
adapt rapidly to the needs of its environment” (p.41, emphasis added).  Divisional 
structures:  are suited to fast change in unstable environments; lead to client satisfaction 
because product responsibility and contact points are clear; allow units to adapt to 
differences in products, regions, clients; decentralize decision making (Daft, 2003, p. 42, 
emphasis added). 
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NSW as a whole fits this divisional model extremely well.  The NSW Groups 
(NSWG) and deployed NSW Task Groups (NSWTG) are the primary conduits between 
the operational fighting units within NSW and the NSW headquarters (CNSWC).  They 
provide financial, material, training, logistic, and administrative support to the deploying 
NSWRONS.  The NSWRON commanders have direct access to the Group commanders, 
which allows minimal filtering of critical information, rapid decision-making, and proper 
adaptation to changing environments. 
The SEAL Teams and deployed NSWRONs are organized with self-reliance in 
mind.  Each unit has its own departments (diving, air, weapons, communications, etc.) 
with the focus of supporting the SEAL platoons.  These platoons, in turn, are made up of 
16-17 SEAL operators, each with his own specialty (diving, weapons, communications, 
medical, air, etc.).  Each Team/NSWRON also has a short vertical chain-of-command 
that consists of the six SEAL platoon commanders/Officers-in-charge (OICs) up through 
the operations officer, and through the executive officer to the commanding officer.  It is 
common for the SEAL platoon OICs to interact directly with the commanding officer.  A 
major advantage to this divisional structure, as with the case of the NSWG/TG, is 
minimal filtering of information between the operators and the decision makers.  With 
this level of flexibility comes the ability to conduct multiple NSW missions efficiently 
and effectively under each smaller NSWRON Task Unit (NSWTU).  This also holds 
true for the NSWRON-NSWTG relationship, but on a larger scale (e.g. multiple NSW 
operations). 
NSW Division Structure Potential Pitfalls? With the division structure comes 
some potential failing points.  Daft points out, that within division structured 
organizations there can be the elimination of economy of scale, poor coordination across 
product lines, elimination of in-depth competence and technical specialization, and 
integration and standardization across product lines can be made difficult (Daft, 2003, 
p.42).  Daft brings up some valid points.  However, NSW, unlike its larger counterpart 
military divisional structures, does not tend to experience these pitfalls—at least not at 
the NSW Teams or NSWRONS.  They have highly specialized personnel, in some cases 
expert personnel trained in multiple specialties that help achieve an economy of force.  
The only exception might be found with the NSWG/TG if they attempt to coordinate 
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multiple subordinate units and overextend their limited staffs.  Examples might include 
too many requirements for intelligence (limited resources), logistics, or mobility, all of 
which are legitimate issues, but the fact remains human information overload is a 
shortcoming of limited staff organizations. 
Environmental sectors in the NSW task environment.  The environment within 
which an organization exists within is comprised of several sectors or subdivisions.  
There are ten sectors that Daft refers to; only four of these are sectors with which NSW 
must contend. 
The first is the human resources sector.  NSW relies heavily on its people—not 
ships, planes, or tanks—for its wartime assets.  NSW training is some of the most 
demanding in the world. The focus is to maximize a SEAL operator’s potential and 
produce an exceptionally aggressive war fighter.  To achieve this level of excellence 
there is a price: only 20% of all SEAL candidates actually graduate.  As a consequence, 
CNSWC is the smallest of the three major component commands of USSOCOM.  NSW 
fights exceptionally hard, mean while, to recruit quality candidates and retain the trained 
operators it already has.  “People are the top priority for the NSW community”—is a 
phrase that is burned into the minds of all SEALs, Special Warfare Combatant Crewmen 
(SWCC), and NSW support personnel from the moment they join the NSW community 
and particular emphasis is placed on the 16 man SEAL platoons.  Without these 
personnel, their high level of training, and operational experience, NSW units can lose 
their relative superiority over potential adversaries.  Relative superiority is a condition 
that exists when an attacking force, generally smaller, gains a decisive advantage over a 
larger or well-defended enemy (McRaven, 1996, p. 4). 
The second sector is the market sector.  For NSW the market sector is 
USSOCOM, Theater SOCs, USN, USA, USAF, and USMC.  NSW provides a variety of 
mission profiles that in one way or another can support these end users. 
The third sector is the government sector.  This relates to the market sector since 
NSW, like the rest of the military, works for the government and depends on political 
processes and support.  Without this support NSW would cease to exist. 
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The final sector is the international sector.  NSW operates all over the world.  
NSW was founded to deal with insurgents, subversives, guerillas, terrorists, and in 
general, all enemies of the US and its allies.  In this example these groups along with 
foreign hostile governments represent the “international competition” that Daft refers to 
(Daft, 2003, p.51).  It is within the international sector that the most uncertainty is 
generated for the future of NSW. 
There are certain levels of consistency in the other three sectors (e.g. suppliers, 
specific commands of authority, human inputs in the training pipelines, etc.) that will not 
change rapidly or without some foreshadowing.  But with the increased sensitivity to and 
awareness of terrorism since September 11, 2001 comes an increase in operational tempo 
(Optempo), personnel tempo (Perstempo), expectations of NSW, etc.  The issue at hand 
is successfully identifying who the players are within this sector.  Generating intelligence 
and cultivating international relationships must increase dramatically before this sector’s 
level of uncertainty can be lowered.  Given the nature of the threat, though, NSW and 
other SOF have a comparative advantage in this sector. 
C. NSW TRAINING AND CAREER PATHS 
1. Initial Path to Becoming a Navy SEAL 
Step 1 (Enlisted).  An individual must first enlist in the US Navy (USN) and go 
through basic indoctrination or Boot Camp.  In most cases, NSW trainees have 
volunteered for and been selected to go to Basic Underwater Demolition School (BUDS), 
Naval Special Warfare Center (NSWC), located at the Naval Amphibious Base (NAB) 
Coronado, CA.  Another source for enlisted personnel into the NSW pipeline is 
augmentation from another occupation within the USN or another service.  All enlisted, 
regardless of their source, must attend BUDS to become SEALs. 
Step 1 (Officer).  For officers the path to BUDS is slightly different.  Most 
officers go to college first and receive their undergraduate degrees, and then are 
commissioned through a variety of sources (including the US Naval Academy [USNA], 
Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps [NROTC], Officer Candidate School [OCS], etc.).  
Prior to their commissioning as Ensigns (beginning rank, O-1), these midshipmen or 
officer candidates will go through a selection process to determine their warfare 
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designation (including Naval Special Warfare) based on a number of criteria, such as 
officer ship, academics, and physical performance.  NSW officers, like enlisted 
personnel, may also be acquired through augmentation from other fleet assignments or 
other services, but they must still attend BUDS. 
Step 2.  Once at BUDS, all trainees are put through one of the toughest military 
training regimens in the world.  It consists of 26 weeks—grouped together into three 
phases—of physically demanding and mentally challenging training: 
¾ First phase:  Conditioning Phase (8 weeks). Physical training (PT), 
swimming, and small boat handling.  Subjects taught include hydrographic 
reconnaissance, physical health and nutrition, and basic maritime 
navigation (MARNAV). 
¾ Second Phase:  Dive Phase (8 weeks).  Technical and academic phase of 
BUDS training.  There is classroom work that involves diving theory, 
medicine, physics, and diving systems and equipment.  Candidates 
develop their combat swimming skills and conduct various dive profiles 
and night combat ship attack exercises. 
¾ Third Phase:  Land Warfare Phase (10 weeks).  The first five weeks are 
spent at BUDS and focus on land navigation, small arms, demolitions 
theory, communications, and squad level tactics.  The second five weeks 
are spent on a remote island training facility.  Training includes squad 
level tactics, underwater and land demolitions, and full mission profile 
(FMP) exercises.  
Step 3. BUDS graduates will be sent to Basic Airborne School (3 weeks), Fort 
Benning, GA, to learn static line parachuting.  Training involves PT, ground school, 
parachute drills, jump simulation equipment, and static line parachuting. 
Step 4.  Once a trainee graduates from BUDS and airborne training he then 
checks into SEAL Qualification Training (SQT) also located at the Naval Special 
Warfare Center.  SQT is a three-month course that involves every aspect of SEAL 
tactical training.  Subjects taught and practiced are air operations, land and maritime 
navigation, small arms, communications, combat medicine, demolitions, desert warfare, 
small unit tactics, combat swimmer, and other maritime operations (i.e. over the beach 
[OTB] reconnaissance).  There are numerous physical and academic challenges in SQT.  
Upon completion of SQT, a “trainee” is officially designated a NSW operator…a SEAL 
and is allowed to wear the NSW warfare pin, the “Trident.” 
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2. Once Qualified as a NSW Officer or Enlisted NSW Operator: 
Step 5.  The new SEALS, once pinned, arrive at their new SEAL Teams or are 
sent off for Swimmer Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Training, mini submarine training, and 
then on to their SDV Teams.   Once at the Teams the new operators are placed into 
SEAL or SDV platoons and assigned combat roles (point man, M-60 gunner, grenadier, 
rear security, etc.) and collateral responsibilities (air operations, boats, diving, weapons, 
communications, medical, intelligence, etc.)—both are required to sustain the platoon 
while in combat operations. 
Step 6. Depending on platoon job assignments, individuals with particular 
aptitudes or personal aspirations will be given the opportunity to attend military and 
civilian specialty schools.  Schooling opportunities include a wide range of subjects: 
sniper, NSW intelligence, target analysis, advanced reconnaissance target analysis 
exploitation, advanced combat medicine, gun smithing and armorer, small boat repair, 
freefall parachuting, jump master (static and freefall), parachute rigging and air load 
planning, language(s), communications, dive equipment repair, advanced applied 
explosives, protective services, regional orientation courses, photo intelligence, ranger 
and pathfinder, etc. 
The majority of NSW language training (length and type varies) is obtained at 
the Defense Language Institute (DLI) at the Presidio of Monterey, Ca.  The DLI also 
provides cultural interaction programs as part its the various language curricula. 
The five regional orientation courses (5 days) available to NSW are offered 
through the US Air Force Special Operations School (USAFSOS), Hurlburt Field, FL.  
Regions discussed are (1) Asia-Pacific, (2) Latin America, (3) Middle East, (4) Russia, 
Central Europe, and Central Asia, and (5) Sub-Saharan Africa.  The courses focus on 
culture, religion, history, politics, regional orientation, terrorism, and territorial issues.  
There is also a five day Cross Cultural Communications Course that discusses the 
effect of culture on the communication process. 
Step 7.  Following the six months of individual training, the SEAL Platoon comes 
together and begins training as a unit—under a NSWG training cadre—developing 
standard operating procedures (SOP) to conduct combat missions.  The training at this 
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level focuses on advanced techniques of insertion, direct action on objectives, and 
extractions.  Subjects include demolitions, parachuting operations, combat swimmer, land 
warfare raids and ambushes, close quarter battle (CQB), special reconnaissance (SR) and 
hydrographic reconnaissance, maritime operations (MAROPs), visit board search and 
seizure (VBSS), and variety of other training evolutions. 
Step 8.  The remaining six months can vary, but are generally utilized to conduct 
SEAL Team/NSWRON interoperability training, pre-deployment preparations, 
operational readiness evaluations, and more advanced training for the platoons (i.e. 
shooting schools and full mission profile training exercises). 
Step 9.  Once preparations are made for a Team deployment, the Teams along 
with additional force multipliers become composite commands known as NSW 
Squadrons (NSWRON).    
Under the new reorganization, NSW 21, the squadron is built around the 
entire SEa, Air and Land (SEAL) Team deploying and includes its senior 
leadership, SEAL Vehicle Delivery Teams and Special Boat Teams, as 
well as personnel detachments such as mobile communications teams, 
tactical cryptologic support and explosive ordnance disposal. Additionally, 
they receive support from five permanently deployed NSW units overseas. 
(HQ USSOCOM, 2003-2004, p. 20) 
Step 10.  The NSWRONs, in turn, deploy for six months overseas and are 
assigned OPCON to the appropriate higher authority in the respective theater of 
operations.  Forward NSW Units (NSWU) will provide bases of operations for these 
NSWRONs.  NSWRONs, once on station, carry out all assigned mission requirements—
wartime engagements (i.e. OEF and OIF), FID, Joint Combined Exercises Training 
(JCET), and major overseas exercises—via Theater Special Operations Commands 
(SOCs), or respective naval higher authorities.  NSW forces can operate independently or 
in conjunction with other U.S. SOF or within U.S. Navy CSGs and ESGs. 
While deployed NSW has the means to disseminate information and intelligence 
in a near real-time manner: 
Systems Integration. By integrating a number of significant systems 
(Secret Internet Protocol Routing Network, Mission Support Center, and 
Special Operations Mission Planning Environment) NSW has decreased 
its footprint forward.  At the same time, it continues to provide its land, 
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ship, and submarine-based forces the ability to conduct worldwide 
collaborative joint mission planning. The NSW Mission Support Center 
employs “reach back technology,” providing forces with the operational 
picture and continuous battle space awareness [perhaps in the future 
supported by HUMINT networks developed by culturally immersed NSW 
personnel]. It also enables deployed forces to connect to resources 
required to rapidly plan and conduct successful special operations 
missions. 
(HQ USSOCOM, 2003-2004, p. 20, emphasis added) 
Step 11.  Depending on the number of deployments an officer or enlisted person 
has done—in addition to the projected rotation date (PRD)—will dictate the next step in 
their career path.  In many cases shore duty (i.e. instructor duty, educational 
opportunities, technical schooling, etc.) may follow their SEAL/SBT/SDV Team 
assignments.  They will in many cases return to the Teams throughout their career 
progression holding greater jobs of responsibilities.  For the officers and enlisted, some of 
the non-SEAL/SBT/SDV Team jobs may include opportunities to work overseas (i.e. 
SOC staffs, USN staffs afloat, personnel exchange programs [PEP], embassies, other 
SOF commands, etc.). 
Step 12.  Post deployment education.  Some NSW officers are given the 
opportunity to pursue graduate level education at the Naval Post Graduate School (NPS), 
Monterey, CA or other military/civilian institutions.  Some enlisted NSW personnel are 
given the opportunity to pursue undergraduate level education through a variety of means 
to include USNA, NROTC, Enlisted College Programs (ECP), Broadened Opportunity 
for Officer Selection and Training (BOOST), as well as the Naval Post Graduate School 
(NPS), Monterey, CA or other military/civilian institutions. 
D. ARCHITECTURE FOR NSW CULTURAL IMMERSION 
 NSW, as it exists presently, has the means to support the development of a NSW 
“Regional Expertise Cultural Immersion (RECI)” program within its ranks.  There is 
a constant need for actionable intelligence, regional, situational, and battlespace 
awareness by all war fighters internal and external to NSW.  NSW’s structure is 
sufficiently flexible to meet these intelligence requirements of its various war fighters.  
NSW is also sufficiently postured to get personnel trained in cultural immersion to at 
least the primary level of cultural immersion (during step 6 above), if not up to the 
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intermediate level of cultural immersion (during step 12 above). Advanced civil 
schooling, regional orientation and intelligence courses, in-country training models, and 
language training are all in place for NSW to utilize. 
For NSW (qualified) enlisted personnel, primary level cultural immersion 
training is available through language schooling and the regional orientation courses (step 
6).  There are also intelligence and targeting schools that platoon intelligence specialists 
(IS) can attend.  There are enlisted SEALs with some language skills, undergraduate 
education, and in other cases even graduate level education.  Additionally there are 
experienced SEALs who operated in the former by region-oriented NSW Teams, and 
therefore have some of this background already. All of this information could be screened 
and used to recruit personnel for further immersion training. 
The enlisted SEALs are the foundation of the NSW community. Junior enlisted 
will clearly tend to have to focus more on honing their war-fighting abilities.  However, 
as enlisted personnel advance in the ranks, become more senior, or are injured, there 
could more opportunities to gain cultural immersion skills and work themselves into 
RECI oriented jobs.  Enlisted personnel are also given the opportunity for commissions 
through programs such as Seaman-to-Admiral, OCS, NROTC, and even the USNA.  
NSW enlisted personnel could be utilized as NSW-RECI specialists and be assigned to a 
Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), NSW Task Group, or NSW Task Unit.  
NSW-RECI specialists would best be utilized at the forward NSW locations, such as the 
NSW Units (NSWUs:  Bahrain, Guam, Puerto Rico, Spain, and Germany) or one of the 
Theater SOCs where they could be temporarily assigned command (TACON) to the 
JSOTF/NSWTG/NSWTU.  The premise is that in these locations the NSW-RECI 
specialists could travel the region (focusing on maritime/littoral areas), develop 
intelligence/support networks, and improve their cultural immersion skills. 
*Recommend post-platoon chiefs.  They are the most likely candidates for these types of 
jobs. 
For NSW (qualified) Officers, elementary cultural immersion is available 
through language schooling and the regional orientation courses as well.  Additionally, 
there are intelligence and targeting schools that platoon officers can attend.  Also, some 
NSW officers may already have some language skills and most have undergraduate 
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education, some perhaps in relevant disciplines.  Again too: there are experienced NSW 
Officers who operated in the formerly region-oriented NSW Teams and therefore have 
some of this background already.  All of this information could be screened and used to 
recruit for further immersion training.  Junior NSW officers are platoon commanders and 
assistant platoon commanders and, as junior officers, will need to focus more on 
becoming proficient in their war fighting skills first.  However, as NSW officers advance 
in the ranks, become more senior, or are injured they could more easily work into RECI 
oriented jobs. 
Also, some NSW officers are given the opportunity to pursue graduate level 
education at NPS or other military/civilian institutions.  Through a number of graduate 
level education programs the Navy already assists Naval Officers (including NSW) to 
pursue graduate education on their own.  If NSW-RECI qualification is desired, the 
NSW officer could pursue advanced education at one of the FAO-approved institutions.  
Upon graduating, the NSW-RECI Liaison Officer (LNO) would be given a 
subspecialty code—similar to the FAO functional codes and Navy subspecialty codes 
assigned presently—designating the region in which he is qualified. 
Following advanced civil schooling, subspecialty code assignment, and 
subsequent language training the NSW officer could be utilized as a NSW-RECI LNO 
and be assigned to a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), NSW Task Group, or 
NSW Task Unit.  NSW-RECI officers would best be utilized at the forward NSW 
locations, such as the NSWUs (Bahrain, Guam, Puerto Rico, Spain, and Germany) or one 
of the Theater SOCs and be temporarily assigned command (TACON) to the 
JSOTF/NSWTG/NSWTU.  Again, as with the RECI specialists, NSW-RECI LNOs could 
travel the region (focusing on maritime/littoral areas), develop intelligence/support 
networks, and improve their cultural immersion skills. 
*Recommend post-platoon and/or post-operations officers, limited duty officers (LDOs), 
and chief warrant officers (CWOs) looking to remain operational.  Many NSW officers 





The grading within the officer and senior enlisted fitness reporting process would 
need to reflect the value added of NSW-RECI LNOs and specialists.  The goal here 
would be to make NSW-RECI jobs highly desirable and career enhancing for all who 
pursued them. 
E. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR NSW-RECI PROGRAM 
According to Daft (2003), “effectiveness” is an instrument used by an 
organization to evaluate attainment of goals (p.23). There are three traditional approaches 
used to measure the effectiveness of an organization.  A goal approach is concerned with 
the output side and whether the organization achieves its goals in terms of desired levels 
of output.  A resource-based approach assesses effectiveness observing the beginning of 
the process and evaluating whether the organization effectively obtains the resources 
necessary for high performance.  The internal process approach looks at internal 
activities and assesses effectiveness by indicators of internal health and efficiency (p. 24).  
There is a more recently developed fourth approach called the stakeholder approach 
which acknowledges that each organization has many constituencies that have a stake in 
its outcomes; “it focuses on the satisfaction of the stakeholders as a performance 
indicator” (Daft, 2003, pp. 24-25). 
The NSW community as a whole utilizes each of the four types of effectiveness at 
all levels.  The goal approach can be witnessed in several venues: the number of 
missions assigned to NSW forces during times of conflict; the number of successes 
reported on Post Operation Reports (POSTOPs) or After Action Reports (AARs); and the 
training and readiness reporting.  It is through these reports that statistical data and/or 
reporting of mission specific details can be evaluated for NSW goal attainment. The goal 
approach also can be seen in reviews of the actual outcomes of operations conducted by 
assigned NSW forces, when a comparison is made to these outcomes met the 
requirements laid down in the NSW chain-of-command’s (COC) vision/mission 
statements. 
NSW also uses the resource approach to evaluate its effectiveness.  In the case 
of NSW this comes with NSW operators’ recruitment, training, and retention.  NSW 
focuses on training and equipping its SEAL and NSW Boat Team members to best meet 
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all strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.  NSW personnel are the key element to 
NSW’s effectiveness.  An example that best demonstrates how adaptive and supportive 
NSW is of its resources is when NSW conducted a complete community-wide 
reorganization in less than three years (to include changing unit structures and 
designations, training, and deployment). 
NSW also follows the internal process approach.  From the outset NSW has 
referred to itself in terms of “Teams.” NSW reinforces the “team concept” through all 
levels of training and readiness preparation.   The idea is that all members have a say in 
how the mission of the Team can best be accomplished.  NSW is adaptive with respect to 
changes.  For example:  in the event a team member (regardless of how junior) has an 
improved method or piece of equipment for conducting operations, the method or tool is 
evaluated in short order and, if deemed effective, is incorporated into the Team’s 
standard operating procedures (SOP). 
NSW, by the very nature of its mission statement, focuses on the stakeholder 
approach as evidenced above in the mission/vision discussion.  CNSWC represents the 
middle ground between the upper levels of command that require NSW forces to carry 
out missions for them and the NSW forces themselves, who require CNSWC to provide 
the guidance and financial support to train and equip their assigned combat forces.  It is 
the stakeholder approach NSW focuses on (without entirely neglecting the other three 
approaches).  The following is a sampling of NSW stakeholders and their interests: 
¾ United States and its Citizens—Security, sound financial investments, 
extremely well trained forces. 
¾ US Domestic and Foreign Policy Makers—Low Intensity Conflicts 
conducted by NSW forces, subtle/“low key” operations vs. massive troop 
movements and “shock and awe” operations. 
¾ US Department of Defense (Secretary of Defense, Sec. Of the Navy, 
Asst. Sec Defense Special Operations Low Intensity Conflict, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff)—Highly trained and effective forces, subtle/“low key” 
operations vs. massive troop movements and “shock and awe” operations. 
¾ Commander US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)—Highly 
skilled Maritime Special Operations forces conducting NSW-related joint 
(purple) missions. 
¾ Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)—Highly skilled Maritime Special 
Operations forces conducting NSW-related maritime (blue) missions. 
83
¾ Theater Commanders (via theater SOCs)—Highly skilled Maritime 
Special Operations forces conducting NSW-related (purple or blue) 
missions. 
¾ Naval Special Warfare Community—Supporting US political and 
military objectives as directed by those entities mentioned above. 
Accomplishing all assigned missions successfully.  Supporting all local 
and deployed NSW units and their families. 
¾ Commander NSW Command (CNSWC)—Providing NSW forces to all 
appropriate combatant commanders.  Training, equipping, and deploying 
highly skilled NSW forces. 
¾ Each of the Six NSW Component Commands—Meeting the 
requirements established by CNSWC to train, equip, and deploy highly 
skilled NSW forces. 
¾ Each of the subordinate NSW commands under each of the NSW 
Component Commands—Provide various levels of training and 
necessary equipment to all assigned NSW operators.  Produce highly 
skilled NSW operators for all assigned NSW missions. 
NSW could apply measures of effectiveness (MOE) to the NSW-RECI program 
by several means.  The first is through internal reports generated from base level units 
(examples include: deployment/exercise AARs, personnel/retention, levels of immersion 
training achieved, etc.)  The second method is through the external reporting generated 
from higher authority (Deployment Orders [DEPORDS], POSTOPs, Situation Reports 
[SITREPS], etc.).  By comparing these reports to the various vision and mission 
statements generated by the NSW Chain-of-Command, definable measures of 
effectiveness for NSW-RECI program could be obtained. 
F. CULTURAL IMMERSION CAN WORK WITHIN NSW 
Each level of the military chain-of-command down to the CNSWC has 
recognized/acknowledged the importance of situational, regional, and battlespace 
awareness—which, essentially, boils down to actionable intelligence.  There is clearly a 
need for a solution to these elusive problems. 
Creativity & Ingenuity (SOF Traits) are the abilities to think and come up with 
novel ideas or alternative solutions to challenging tasks.  They allow the practitioner to 
not only think outside of the box, but to operate unconventionally while still inside. 
The NSW culture supports and facilitates the values of teamwork, creativity, and 
ingenuity within the NSW community.  NSW—with its organization, capabilities, 
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internal culture, and training—is capable of adapting to better function in any 
environment.  NSW has always viewed itself as able to balance environmental needs and 
“strategic focus.”  By virtue of its size, NSW has this flexibility;   it adapts to situations 
fairly rapidly without huge operational requirements. 
Given its cohesiveness, the NSW community works collectively in an effort to 
achieve common objectives.    NSW is one of the primary units tasked to gather the 
desired “actionable intelligence” mentioned above and, when authorized, will act on it.  
One of the means to accomplish this tasking is through a NSW-RECI program.  NSW has 
the training pipeline to accommodate the required schooling, to get its personnel NSW-
RECI qualified—without derailing NSW operators’ careers.  There are established 
programs NSW can use as models for a RECI program.  There are overseas NSW units 
and billets that can properly employ individuals with such specialized skills.  NSW also 
has the measures of effectiveness to evaluate the value that would be added by a NSW-
RECI program.  Cultural immersion training, if properly employed, could make NSW 
operations run more smoothly and effectively.  The result is…fewer 




A. THE OFFICIAL NEED FOR CULTURAL IMMERSION 
After a thorough review of the 9/11 Commission’s Report, the US National 
Security Strategy, US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, National Military 
Strategy, and various military vision statements and objectives,  it is apparent there is a 
constant drumbeat for increased intelligence and proactive operations to disrupt and 
destroy terrorist organizations as part of the GWOT.  There is also a recurring theme 
about the “New Enemy of Freedom” and how this enemy operates as if it is a ghost—
with complete anonymity. 
A wide variety of associated terms—referring to desired US capabilities—have 
been discussed throughout this thesis, terms such as actionable intelligence, cultural 
understanding, special operations, mindsets and motivation of the enemy, enhanced 
language skills, creativity, social networks, reconnaissance, combating terrorism, direct 
action, unconventional capabilities, information operations, HUMINT, human 
information resourcing, intelligence and operational preparation of the battlespace, 
regional expertise, immersion skills, and the list goes on.  In short, they all require that 
we become more situationally aware in given regions of the world through a unity of 
effort.   Decision makers armed with this situational awareness will be better positioned 
to make decisive decisions, decisions that will include when to employ highly capable 
forces to go after terrorists, their organizations, and their supporting infrastructure. 
The national requirements are all here, but they raise the question: How do you 
collect time critical and actionable intelligence, and then act to disrupt or intercept small 
well-organized groups such as terrorists?  One possible method suggested in these 
documents is via deployment of specialized troops backed by solid intelligence support 
architecture.  This method, though, raises additional questions: Has this been done 
before?  If so, by whom and under what circumstances? What special skills did they 
have? Given implications for the strategy and policy raised by these questions I wondered 
what SOF—and Naval Special Warfare in particular—might do, and why cultural 
immersion skills, couldn’t be used as part of the solution. 
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B. CULTURAL IMMERSION: USED IN WARFARE 
I set about researching instances in which cultural immersion skills or training had 
been employed in the last century.  My research focused on the WWI Arab Revolt, OSS 
operations in WWII, and NSW operations in the Vietnam War. 
In reference to T.E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt, I found he used cultural 
immersion throughout his operations with the Arabs as they fought against the Turks.  
The key takeaways from his experience were the importance of speaking native 
languages, knowing the region, understanding the Arab culture and religion, and having 
an insider’s perspective of how the Arab mind worked.  Lawrence developed strong 
social bonds with the Arabs.  He lived among them and his skills allowed him to gain 
access into Arab circles that most westerners would never achieve.  Even so, he did 
profess that even with his skills and knowledge—due to his physical appearance—he 
could not blend in with the local peoples (he did attempt to do so by wearing native 
attire).    Regardless of the ‘appearance challenge,’ he was able to establish a very 
effective working relationship with Arab leaders and carried out a successful guerilla 
campaign thanks to his considerable cultural immersion skills.  He accomplished all this, 
while using simple means of transport (i.e. camels) and relatively limited lines of 
communication. 
During WWII, the US was unprepared for the intelligence requirements of the 
time or the theater locations.  The US military in 1941 did not have a specialized force 
structure (i.e. a USSOCOM) that it could call upon to meet the Axis power’s threats.  
With necessity being the mother of invention, the OSS was formed and set the standards 
for SOF.  The skill sets of the OSS of the 1940s are not unlike those of present-day SOF, 
to include guerilla warfare, land and waterborne commando training, small arms, hand-
to-hand, unconventional/irregular warfare, partisan and resistance training, small boat and 
submersible tactics, communications, flight school, foreign language, parachuting, 
demolitions, regional expertise, and cultural understanding.  All of these were needed and 
employed throughout the course of WWII.  Cultural immersion skills, in particular, were 
used effectively in both Western Europe and in the Burma Campaigns by OSS and 
related allied units. 
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As with Lawrence, appearance posed a problem in some locations, language in 
others.  But even with the physical and language barriers many OSS units faced, they 
were able to overcome them through reliable interpreters, regional experts (i.e. 
missionaries or military previously posted in the region), and native troops.  The 
Burma/Kachin OSS units, like Lawrence and his irregulars—though not quite to the same 
degree—developed common goals, bonds of trust, and unity of effort against the 
Japanese. 
During Vietnam, a new type of warfare emerged, guerilla-insurgent warfare.  
This, for conventional commanders and their troops, presented a constant challenge.  
SOF in Vietnam evolved/changed to address this type of threat.  In many cases the threat 
was invisible. The enemy, like terrorists today, could operate in cities or out in the 
provinces, towns, villages, and hamlets.  To contend with this threat, NSW (SEALs), 
were paired up with LDNN, PRU, Hoi Chanhs, Biet Hai, and other irregular forces—
through the Phoenix program—a match that effectively used what cultural immersion and 
military skills the SEALs and their Vietnamese counterparts had available to develop 
field experience to carry out an extremely effective campaign against the VCI and NVA.  
Like the OSS in Burma, the Vietnam SEALs could not blend in with the local 
populations, but their indigenous forces could.  So they capitalized on that fact and 
developed intelligence networks.  The result was an organic ability to collect actionable 
intelligence, plan missions, and interdict VCI leadership, guerillas, and cache sites in 
short order. 
The SEALs did not totally immerse themselves in the local cultures, but they did 
realize the tremendous value added by using culturally immersed personnel (Vietnamese 
units and individuals previously discussed).  The SEALs used what immersion skills they 
did have to establish the levels of trust to operate with and gather information through 
these personnel. These immersed Vietnamese personnel were extremely well connected 
throughout the various provinces.  They provided the insider perspective and requisite 
language skills to better enable the SEALs to conduct the NSW missions the SEALs were 
sent to Vietnam to accomplish. 
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C. CULTURAL IMMERSION:  IN MILITARY CONTEXT 
Cultural immersion is a broad-based combination of education, training, and 
practical skills and experiences that allows a practitioner to adapt and/or become 
immersed in a particular group or society on some level.  Cultural immersion entails an 
understanding of integrated patterns of human behavior that includes thought, speech, 
action, and artifacts, in other words, the customary beliefs, social forms, and material 
traits of an ethnic, religious, or social group.  The fundamental objectives of cultural 
immersion are first to develop a SA in a given region, and second to develop a network of 
trust among the local people (native, naturalized, or transient) within the region of 
interest. 
Levels of cultural immersion can be broken down into the following five levels: 
peripheral, primary, intermediate, advanced, and indigenous or native.  Each level 
depends on the proficiency of culturally immersed personnel to accomplish their given 
tasks or job assignments utilizing their knowledge/experience, which in turn depends on 
knowledge of local language(s), ideologies/religions, social interactions, 
politics/leadership, daily routines/rituals, economics, values/ethics, and region-specific 
adaptations. 
Cultural immersion skills allow the military practitioner to communicate with 
indigenous or foreign personnel, civilian or military.  Cultural immersion skills are a 
means to an end.  From a military perspective they should be utilized for two purposes:  
first to gather HUMINT with an insider’s perspective; second, they can be used to help 
conduct more sophisticated, nuanced, and accurate mission planning and execution 
within a given battlespace or region. Furthermore, cultural immersion allows units with 
these capabilities to better accomplish mission essential coordination with other allied or 
indigenous paramilitary type forces. Mission essential coordination may include some or 
all of the following items: CAS, artillery fire support, TGO, and deconfliction (to avoid 
fratricide).  Cultural immersion can also provide a means by which to gain logistics 





D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NSW CULTURAL IMMERSION 
If the intent is that NSW forces better establish intelligence networks which, in 
turn, will allow these NSW forces to track down and address the threats presented by 
terrorist organizations or insurgent movements in a direct and time sensitive manner, then 
it seems paramount to consider what NSW could learn—or  borrow—from other entities.  
Which resource or warfare specialty has the focus on immersion skills to the fidelity that 
would allow NSW to get its forces trained to at least a primary or intermediate level of 
proficiency, and preferably the latter? 
The answer is the Army’s FAO program.  The FAO program is designed to 
create highly trained experts on specific regions of the globe.  It has the pre-existing 
schools and training required to qualify NSW personnel to an acceptable level of cultural 
immersion to operate.  FAO training is well designed and systematic.  The result is 
advanced firsthand practical experiences in a given region, to include the development of 
contacts and potential networks. FAOs function at an intermediate to advanced 
immersion level. 
Individuals with FAO skills can bring situational awareness and intelligence 
networks to bear, to identify and/or affect COGs or critical nodes.  NSW regional experts 
could provide HUMINT resources and indigenous military forces intelligence with 
support for NSW missions.  Depending on their level of immersion they could provide an 
insider’s perspective.  They could also be used as interpreters, or at the very least, to 
screen interpreters.  They could be used to identify key political leaders, both in formal 
and informal networks.  If authorized, they could conduct time critical targeting or 
leadership interdiction operations and other sorts of short notice mission profiles.  These 
NSW regional experts (still operators) could provide key mission planning support. 
As a secondary responsibility, individuals with this training could fill unit support 
roles.  These support responsibilities should be very specific in scope and designed so as 
not to put these highly trained NSW operators into administrative roles.  Instead, 
individuals with this training must be regarded as tremendous intelligence assets and 
should not to be improperly utilized. Certainly, they could provide liaison capabilities 
with the host countries where NSW forces may be operating.  They could also arrange 
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translator services.  They could scout out or expedite the procurement of appropriate 
basing sites for JSOTF or NSWTG.  They could also assist in the procurement of 
indigenous transportation, as required. 
NSW, as it exists presently, has the means to support the development of a NSW 
“Regional Expertise Cultural Immersion (RECI)” program within its ranks.  There is 
a constant need for actionable intelligence, and regional, situational, and battlespace 
awareness by all war fighters internal and external to NSW.  NSW is structured to be 
sufficiently flexible to meet these intelligence requirements of the various war fighters it 
supports.  The NSW organization is also postured to get personnel trained in cultural 
immersion to—at least initially a primary level of cultural immersion, if not up to the 
intermediate level of cultural immersion. The advanced civil schooling, regional 
orientation and intelligence courses, in-country training models, and language training 
opportunities are all in place for NSW to utilize. 
For NSW enlisted personnel, primary level cultural immersion training is 
available through language schooling and regional orientation courses.  There is also 
intelligence and targeting schools that platoon intelligence specialists can attend.  There 
are enlisted SEALs with some language skills, undergraduate education, and in some 
cases even graduate level education—additionally there are experienced SEALs that 
operated in the formerly region-oriented NSW Teams. 
As enlisted personnel advance in the ranks there could more opportunities gain 
cultural immersion skills and work into RECI oriented jobs.  Enlisted personnel are also 
given the opportunity for commissions through programs.  NSW enlisted personnel could 
be utilized as NSW-RECI specialists and be assigned to a JSOTF, NSWTG, or NSWTU.  
NSW-RECI specialists would best be utilized at the forward NSW locations such as the 
NSWUs (NSWUs:  Bahrain, Guam, Puerto Rico, Spain, and Germany) or one of the 
Theater SOCs and be TACON to the JSOTF/NSWTG/NSWTU.  The premise is that in 
these locations the NSW-RECI specialists could travel the region (focus on 
maritime/littoral portions), develop intelligence/support networks, and improve their 
cultural immersion skills. 
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For NSW qualified Officers, elementary cultural immersion is available through 
language schooling and the regional orientation courses as well.  Additionally, there are 
intelligence and targeting schools that the platoon officers can attend.  Also some NSW 
officers with some language skills and most have undergraduate education—additionally 
there are experienced NSW Officers that operated under the formerly region-oriented 
NSW Teams. 
As NSW officers advance in the ranks they could more easily work into 
immersion oriented jobs.  Some NSW officers are given the opportunity to pursue 
graduate level education at NPS or other military/civilian institutions.  There are a 
number of graduate level education programs that the Navy has in place to assist Naval 
Officers (including NSW) to pursue graduate education on their own. 
If NSW-RECI qualification is desired, the NSW officer could pursue one of the 
FAO approved institutions.  Upon graduating, the NSW-RECI Liaison Officer would be 
given a subspecialty code—similar to the FAO functional codes and Navy subspecialty 
assigned presently—that designated the region in which he is qualified. 
Following the advanced civil schooling, subspecialty code assignment, and 
subsequent language training the NSW officer could be utilized as a NSW-RECI LNO 
and be assigned to a JSOTF, NSW Task Group, or NSW Task Unit.  NSW-RECI officers 
would best be utilized at the forward NSW locations such as the NSWUs (Bahrain, 
Guam, Puerto Rico, Spain, and Germany) or one of the Theater SOCs and be TACON to 
the JSOTF/NSWTG/NSWTU.  The same premise—as with the RECI specialist—NSW-
RECI LNOs could travel the region (focus on maritime/littoral portions), develop 
intelligence/support networks, and improve their cultural immersion skills. 
The grading within the officer and senior enlisted fitness reporting process would 
need to reflect the value added by NSW-RECI LNOs and specialists.  The goal here 
would be to make NSW-RECI jobs highly desirable and career enhancing for all who 
pursued them. 
Operating in small numbers, SEALs’ ability to conduct clandestine, high-
risk missions and provide real time intelligence and eyes on target, offer 
decision makers immediate and virtually unlimited options in the face of 
rapidly changing wartime situations.  SEALs maintain a forward presence, 
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regional orientation, language skills, and cultural awareness as they 
conduct operations throughout the world. 
With half the world’s industry and population located within one mile of 
an ocean or navigable river and 144 of 170 sovereign nations accessible 
from sea or river systems, Naval Special Warfare’s unique maritime 
capabilities make it a proven force for the future. 
(HQ USSOCOM, 2003-2004, pp. 20-21, emphasis added) 
Cultural immersion is not the final ends to the final means.  Rather, it is a tool or 
skill set that allows missions to develop and to be executed with smooth transitions.  It 
does not guarantee mission success but certainly assures greater mission success than can 
be achieved operating without it.  Cultural immersion allows those who possess these 
skills—or the forces they have working for them who possess these skills—to have a 
distinct edge over an adversary who doesn’t have these assets.  Cultural immersion also 
“evens up the playing field” when US or allied forces are operating in foreign lands 
against otherwise invisible or immersed enemies. 
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